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of the Financial Services Authority. They do not. All errors or omissions 
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Foreword 
The FSA is committed to encouraging debate among academics, practitioners 
and policy-makers in all aspects of financial regulation. To facilitate this, it 
publishes a series of Occasional Papers in financial regulation, extending 
across economics and other disciplines. 
These papers cover topics such as the rationale for regulation, the costs and 
benefits of various aspects of regulation, and the structure and development 
of markets in financial services. Since their main purpose is to stimulate 
interest and debate, the FSA welcomes the opportunity to publish 
controversial and challenging material, including papers that may have been 
presented or published elsewhere. Such publication in no way implies that the 
FSA agrees with the views expressed. 
The main factor in accepting papers, which will be independently refereed, is 
that they should make substantial contributions to knowledge and 
understanding in the area of financial regulation. The FSA encourages 
contributions from external authors, as well as from its own staff. In either 
case, the papers will express the views of the author(s) and not those of the 
FSA. 
If you want to contribute to this series, please contact Peter Andrews, Stefan 
Hunt or Michael Straughan at, respectively: 
 
Telephone: 020 7066 3104; 020 7066 354; 020 7066 5242 
Email: peter.andrews@fsa.gov.uk; stefan.hunt@fsa.gov.uk; 
michael.straughan@fsa.gov.uk  
These Occasional Papers are available in the Research section of the Library 
at www.fsa.gov.uk. Comments are welcome on these papers; please address 
them to the contacts listed above. 
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Abstract 
When financial regulators require banks to hold a higher ratio of equity capital 
to debt funding, banks incur short-term costs as they adjust their balance 
sheets and lose some of the advantages associated with their existing funding 
mix. They then seek to maintain post-tax income by, for example, raising 
lending margins. Higher lending margins tend to lower the volumes of 
borrowing. This creates a trade-off between the greater stability associated 
with a higher ratio of equity capital to debt funding and the level of economic 
activity in the short to medium term. While the benefits of greater stability are 
obviously very large, and the reduction in economic activity is very unlikely to 
be on a comparable scale, exploring the trade-off is not straightforward. Past 
work on this did not solve all of the modelling problems, nor does this paper. 
We do, however, report some useful developments, which may assist in 
calibrating policy or monitoring the impacts of judgements already made. 
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1 Introduction 
The choice and calibration of prudential standards historically has been 
largely an international process of political economy informed by judgement 
(e.g. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2006)). Before the 
Turner Review (FSA (2009a) and FSA (2009b)), only limited effort had been 
made to provide empirical support for these judgements although theoretical 
approaches to analyse the effects of adjusting capital requirements have been 
posited (e.g. Repullo and Suarez (2004); Van den Heuvel (2008)). 
Specifically, financial regulators did not use research findings about how 
banks react to changes in prudential standards to explore any trade-offs 
between stability and the provision of finance to the real economy. Nor did 
they examine the links between the calibration of prudential standards and the 
probability of financial crises occurring. 
We and others at the FSA have taken the lead in seeking to fill the evidential 
gaps described above. This resulted in Occasional Papers 22 (Alfon et al 
(2006)), 31 (Francis and Osborne (2009a)) and 36 (OP36) (Francis and 
Osborne (2009b)), which sought to give a clear understanding of how banks 
have reacted to changes in prudential standards. OP36 confirmed that banks 
react to changes in regulatory capital requirements by dynamically adjusting 
both their level of capital and their level of risk-weighted assets to reach a 
desired capital ratio. This approach to estimating the additional capital that 
banks would need to hold in response to higher capital requirements is far 
more realistic than approaches that use banks’ existing balance sheet assets 
to calculate new capital requirements, or that are not empirically based at all.  
The evidence in OP36 that the specific reaction of individual banks to changes 
in prudential standards depends on their individual balance sheet composition 
when the standards are announced was used to develop a model that 
aggregates firm-specific data about the condition and reactions of the UK’s 
largest banks to changes in prudential policy. The model then aggregates 
these individual responses to show a sector-wide response. This model 
currently covers about 75% of UK banks’ assets. 
We also worked with the National Institute of Economic and Social Research 
(NIESR) to help produce Occasional Paper 38 (OP38) in this series (Barrell, 
Davis, Fic et al (2009)). This includes a new methodology for determining the 
costs and benefits of bank capital and liquidity requirements for the economy 
as a whole.  
Exploring the trade-offs between stability and the provision of finance to the 
real economy, and identifying the factors that influence the probability of 
financial crises occurring, is not at all straightforward. Numerous modelling 
challenges are involved, and we have been careful to make clear that we are 
far from having the answers to all of these. Even so, it should be possible to 
improve future policy judgements, and the monitoring of the impacts of 
judgements already made, by improving the evidence base. We therefore 
sought to address some of the weaknesses in previous modelling – these 
efforts, together with the new results generated, are reported in this paper. 
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There have now been important international efforts to generate research into 
the impacts of higher prudential standards on the global economy (see BCBS 
(2010a), BCBS (2010b) and BCBS (2010c)). The BCBS findings are 
consistent with those generated for the UK from the work mentioned above. 
1.1 Principal improvements to our model 
It is obvious that the kind of modelling described above can give only 
approximate answers to the difficult questions that policy makers must 
address. Empirical research on how banks react to changes in prudential 
standards is unavoidably based mostly on data generated during the ‘great 
moderation’ (around 1990 to 2007). It remains to be seen just how similar 
post-crises reactions will be. The prudential changes driving these reactions 
were less material and pervasive than Basel III and the other post-crisis 
measures. Moreover, assessment of the economic impacts of banks’ 
reactions depends on the outputs of macroeconomic models, which 
themselves are unavoidably the result of the interaction of a large number of 
equations representing imperfectly understood (or estimated) relationships. 
This does not mean that the modelling fails to achieve some clear and 
important results. A bank that is obliged to move from its present ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted assets to a higher ratio must choose one or more of 
the following three options: (i) raising fresh, qualifying capital; (ii) reducing the 
outright value of its assets; and (iii) lowering the average risk-weighting of its 
assets. The final option means that meeting higher liquidity standards that 
involve holding incremental highly liquid paper also contributes to meeting 
higher capital standards. We see that, in reality, banks use all three options 
for increasing their ratios of capital to risk-weighted assets. Historically, in the 
UK, about half of the required adjustment has come through increases in 
capital and about half through reductions in risk-weighted assets (relative to 
the level of capital and assets that would have pertained in the absence of the 
policy change).  
We also see that banks pass at least some of the cost of the adjustment to 
their customers in the form of an increased interest rate margin or ‘wedge’ 
between lending and deposit rates. Customers, especially corporate 
customers, react to the increase in the lending wedge by reducing their 
borrowing from banks. Indeed, it appears that the increase in the wedge faced 
by corporate borrowers in the short term is typically greater than the increase 
faced by household customers. This may be because the greater demand 
elasticity on the part of corporate borrowers helps banks to reduce their risk-
weighted assets most efficiently. Some but not all of the reduction in 
borrowing from banks is offset by borrowing from other sources, such as 
shadow banks or in debt markets by firms issuing their own paper. 
By including the relationship between bank capital/liquidity and the lending 
wedge in NIESR’s macroeconomic model NiGEM, the impact of higher 
regulatory requirements on overall UK economic output can be estimated 
using a general, rather than partial, equilibrium approach. While reduced 
borrowing from banks is associated with a reduction in the level of investment 
and consumption, the effect is not as large as one might expect from the 
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reduction in banks’ assets. The impact on GDP is small, presumably because 
of sufficient availability of substitutes for bank lending.  
Another clear finding is that allowing banks a lengthy transition period to 
higher prudential standards lowers the macroeconomic costs (BCBS (2010b) 
and BCBS (2010c)). This is intuitive. Banks are somewhat constrained by 
long-term lending contracts. If they are obliged to move rapidly to higher 
prudential standards, they will have to achieve a higher proportion of the 
adjustment through raising fresh capital. This might have to be done at a time 
when capital is expensive, or the fact that many banks are raising fresh capital 
at the same time may itself make bank capital expensive. Our preliminary 
research on the FSA’s tighter supervisory prudential regime introduced in the 
immediate wake of the financial crisis tentatively supports this observation. 
We find that banks’ response to the new measures has been somewhat 
different from the historical experience: rather than about half of the required 
adjustment coming through increases in banks’ capital and about half through 
reductions in risk-weighted assets, about 60% of the adjustment was made 
through capital and 40% through assets, although the evidence is far from 
conclusive. 
An important development since the publication of OP38 is an improved 
model of financial crisis. The modelling of benefits in OP38 depends on a 
Logit model of the probability of a financial crisis occurring, with capital and 
liquidity ratios as key determinants of the likelihood. The benefits of higher 
prudential standards are obtained by multiplying the cost of a crisis, measured 
in terms of GDP losses in past crises, by the change in the probability of crisis 
that results from changes in capital and liquidity requirements. We take the 
net present value of the expected costs and benefits over a long time frame to 
obtain our measure of the net impact on GDP. By applying this approach to a 
range of changes in requirements, one can identify what level of higher 
standards would cease to provide net benefits for the economy overall, aside 
from welfare effects. 
The two main improvements to the crisis model reported in OP38 are as 
follows. First, the probabilities of crisis are updated annually in Bayesian 
fashion to ensure different states of the world are appropriately taken into 
account. Second, another significant variable has been added to the crisis 
model. As reported in OP38, the model included the capital and liquidity ratios 
of banks and the rate of change in house prices, a variable which is strongly 
associated with the incidence of past crises. The model now also includes the 
balance on the UK’s current account. Since house prices and the current 
account deficit are not solely the product of financial regulation, the crisis 
model suggests that financial regulators by themselves do not hold all of the 
levers that influence the probability of financial crisis. It appears that monetary 
and even fiscal policy may also be relevant (see, for example, Cecchetti, 
Genberg et al (2000), Acharya et al (2009), Reinhart et al (2009)). This tends 
to validate the role of the Financial Policy Committee as set out in HM 
Treasury’s recent paper (HM Treasury (2011)). 
A specific result of the improved modelling presented here is that our central 
estimate of the impacts of the (realistic) package of policy measures that we 
analyse is a small long-run increase in national income. In other words, any 
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short-run reductions in GDP are more than offset in the longer term as crises 
become rarer. This is in addition to the increase in stability itself, which we 
would expect to be associated with a substantial increase in welfare (on the 
basis that people have a strong preference for stability).  
We have also undertaken stochastic simulations to place confidence bands 
around our central estimate of impacts on national income. These show that 
the true outcome, in income terms, may be materially more or less favourable 
than the central estimate, although the error bands are skewed towards higher 
net benefits. Even an outcome of net costs in terms of national income would 
not, however, have any direct effect on the very large welfare benefits of 
stability. 
1.2 What is in this paper? 
The FSA’s Discussion Paper 09/04 (FSA 2009b) acknowledged a number of 
issues with the framework of analysis deployed in OP38. Much of this paper 
describes the methodological improvements we have subsequently made. 
Our fresh estimate of the impacts of an updated package of policy measures 
is also included. 
Specifically, the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review recent 
literature on estimates of the costs of the recent crisis, and the costs and 
benefits of prudential policy. We also briefly explore other relevant research. 
In section 3, we describe the work we have done to model the responses of 
individual banks to changes in prudential standards. This is an important 
addition to the framework described in OP38, since it ensures that the correct 
inputs are used in the macroeconomic modelling, given a particular calibration 
of new prudential standards. In section 4, we discuss changes made to the 
modelling of the costs, including the calibration of the cost of increasing the 
capital ratio and how we have dealt with the issue of the different types of 
capital referenced in the recent policy proposals. In section 5, we describe the 
improvements we have made to the modelling of benefits by adding variables 
to the crisis prediction model. We also describe additional work undertaken on 
the depth and length of a crisis and the Bayesian calculation of expected 
benefits. Section 6 includes our estimate of the impacts of an updated 
package of policy measures on the UK economy and a general discussion of 
the caveats and limitations of this estimate. Finally, section 7 discusses some 
of the uncertainties around our results. 
1.3 Would further work be useful? 
The law of diminishing returns clearly applies when results are unavoidably 
approximate. There is, however, one big issue that might merit further 
consideration. So far, policy and related research have dealt almost entirely 
with individual banks rather than with banks as a network. This has the 
advantage of being relatively simple and the disadvantage of not dealing 
directly with an important reason for prudential regulation: network 
externalities.  
Recent papers (e.g. Haldane and May, 2011) have begun to explore the 
characteristics that appear to make the banking network more or less stable. It 
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is clear that the probability of financial crisis depends partly on the strength of 
individual nodes (i.e. banks) within the network and partly on some 
characteristics of the network itself. These may include the complexity of the 
network and the extent of similarity between the exposures of the individual 
nodes. For example, a high degree of complexity and major exposures by 
individual nodes to the same asset classes may materially reduce the stability 
of the network. Such features of the banking network may be influenced by 
prudential regulation or even conduct regulation, especially if these include 
elements that bear on the operation of competition, as is likely. 
Our existing crisis model does implicitly take some account of network effects. 
For example, one of the features captured by our house price variable may be 
lack of diversity between nodes. Also, the observed increase in stability 
associated with higher capital and liquidity standards takes account of any 
effects these standards have on the structure of the network or diversity of 
exposures. However, the model does not include any direct measures of the 
relationship between the probability of crisis and structural features of the 
network. This could be a useful development, for example if policy makers are 
able to develop policy interventions designed to change the structure of the 
network (possibly while leaving the level of capital unchanged). Such 
empirical modelling might, in addition to providing measures of the impact of 
policy, reveal which firms are truly of systemic importance (what if it is not just 
the large ones?) and which features of the network are related most strongly 
to financial crisis. There would, however, be significant issues about data and 
feasibility to address. 
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2 Literature review 
In this section, we discuss some recent papers that estimate the impact of 
prudential policy on the economy. We then discuss a number of papers 
outlining important uncertainties in current analysis of the impacts of 
prudential regulation. 
2.1 Examining estimates of the impact of prudential policy 
OP38 sets out a framework for estimating the costs and benefits to the UK 
economy of higher capital and liquidity standards, and also provides 
preliminary estimates of these costs and benefits. Specifically, OP38 
proposes an approach to quantifying the benefits based on the ‘early warning’ 
literature on crisis prediction. This determines the historical links between the 
probability of a financial crisis occurring and a set of explanatory variables, 
using a multivariate logit model similar to that developed by Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998). Historical macroeconomic data and levels of banking 
sector capitalisation and liquidity from OECD countries are used to estimate 
the change in the probability that a financial crisis occurs. The inclusion of 
banking sector specific ratios related to capital and liquidity allows the change 
in the probability of crisis to be attributed directly to changes in financial 
regulation. To calculate the benefits of tightening prudential standards, the 
change in probability of crisis is multiplied by an estimate of the expected 
cumulative loss in GDP associated with crisis. This loss is estimated from 
NIESR’s NiGEM world economic model. 
OP38 examines the costs of the regulatory changes by estimating a set of 
UK-specific, reduced-form equations that link higher capital and liquidity levels 
in the UK banking system to loan spreads in both consumer and corporate 
credit markets. When incorporated into NiGEM, these banking sector 
equations estimate the expected deviation of the path of economic output 
from the baseline as a result of the estimated changes in borrowing costs in 
the economy. The framework outlined in OP38 forms the basis of our own 
modelling work: our use of the model is described in greater detail later in this 
paper. 
2.1.1 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Groups 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the BCBS established two working 
groups – the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG) and the Long-term 
Economic Impact (LEI) Group – to coordinate international efforts to measure 
the likely macroeconomic impacts of stronger bank capital and liquidity 
requirements. The reports by these two groups focus on the macroeconomic 
costs of the transition to the new regulatory standards, and their long-run 
impact, respectively. 
The report from the MAG (BCBS (2010b) and BCBS (2010c)) aggregates the 
outputs of macroeconomic models from 15 member countries, as well as a 
number of international organisations, to examine the macroeconomic effects 
of the transition to substantially increased capital and liquidity standards. Most 
submissions to the group from member countries use a two-step procedure to 
estimate the macroeconomic impacts on individual economies: 
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 First, members estimated the effects of the changes in prudential 
standards on lending spreads and volumes using either accounting-based 
estimates or estimates based on banks’ dynamic balance sheet 
adjustments in response to shortfalls against desired capital ratios, as in 
the methodology developed in OP36. 
 Second, the impact on lending spreads was used in members’ standard 
macroeconomic policy analysis models to estimate the impact on GDP. 
Other simulations of the impact were carried out using dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models. These sought to take account of non-
price adjustments, such as bank credit rationing or lending standard effects. 
The IMF world economic model was also used to take account of any cross-
country affects not addressed in member country models. 
From the median outcome of all the simulation results, the MAG estimates 
that a one percentage point increase in the core equity capital ratio 
implemented over eight years would widen lending spreads by a maximum of 
15.5 basis points (on average across all affected countries) and reduce the 
level of GDP by a maximum of 0.15% from a baseline of no change in policy. 
The reduction in GDP rises to 0.17% after adjusting for additional international 
spillover effects, as estimated by the IMF using its world economic model. 
Based on the results of the BCBS quantitative impact study (QIS) undertaken 
as part of the Basel III calibration exercise, the MAG calculates that banks’ 
existing capital ratios are only 1.3 percentage points below the Basel III 
agreed minimum plus the capital conservation buffer. Assuming that the costs 
in terms of national income increase linearly with increases in banks’ capital 
ratios, the MAG estimates that raising banks capital to this level would reduce 
the level of global GDP by a maximum of 0.22% from a baseline that excludes 
any change in banks’ capital levels. This reduction would occur during the 
transition to new standards (estimated to be around 35 quarters). The growth 
rate would be only 0.03 percentage points below the baseline over the 
transition period before returning to earlier average long-run growth rates. 
The report by the second FSB-BCBS working group, the LEI (BCBS (2010a)) 
focuses on estimating the steady-state costs and benefits of the stronger 
capital and liquidity requirements. While the LEI report observes that model 
uncertainty is too high to calculate the optimum calibration, it finds substantial 
net benefits from raising the core equity capital ratio by up to 8 percentage 
points and implementing the new liquidity requirements, based on Basel II 
definitions of capital and risk-weighted assets. 
In line with OP38, the LEI calculates benefits by multiplying the expected 
cumulative GDP loss from a crisis by the reduction in the probability of the 
crisis due to tighter prudential standards. The estimates of the cumulative 
costs of financial crisis, however, are based on an extensive literature review 
that finds that the median cumulative cost of a crisis is 63% of GDP, but 
results vary substantially depending on the duration of the effects of a crisis 
on output. A critical issue here is whether the effects are permanent. The 
report uses a range of models to calculate the effect of prudential standards 
on the probability of the crisis, including empirical models of the historical links 
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between incidence of crises and the capital and liquidity levels in the banking 
system (e.g. Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2010c); Kato et al (2010)), 
portfolio credit risk methodologies applied to the banking sector as a whole, 
and stress-testing models.  
To estimate the costs, the LEI first uses an aggregate bank balance sheet 
from 13 OECD countries to estimate the increase in loan spreads required to 
maintain the historical return on equity in the face of increased regulatory 
costs. It finds that a 1 percentage point change in the capital ratio raises loan 
spreads by 13 basis points. The additional cost of meeting the liquidity 
standards is estimated to be approximately 14 basis points, after accounting 
for the associated fall in risk-weighted assets. These intermediate results are 
used in a range of members’ macroeconomic models to find that a 1 
percentage point increase in capital standards reduces long-run GDP by 
0.09% relative to baseline, while the GDP reduction associated with the 
liquidity requirements is 0.08%. 
More recently, Angelini et al (2011) replicated the methodology used by the 
LEI to calculate the impact on long-term economic performance of the 
Basel III proposals, producing estimates consistent with the LEI and MAG 
reports. The paper also extended the analysis in the LEI report by using 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models to assess the impact 
of the Basel III proposals on the volatility of economic output for various 
different countries. The paper reports that the volatility in economic output is 
reduced with the introduction of Basel III, although the impact differs widely 
across countries. 
Two key caveats to the methodology used in this study are highlighted in the 
paper. First, the impact of liquidity policy is particularly uncertain due to a lack 
of data available for empirical analysis and other data issues. Second, the 
extent of uncertainty in the model outputs means that the heterogeneity of the 
impacts across countries cannot be derived with confidence. Consequently, 
the outputs represent a range of possible outcomes in which individual 
country impacts cannot be identified with any precision. 
A criticism of the approaches discussed above lies in their reliance on models 
with highly simplified financial sectors that assume perfect financial markets 
and have few, if any, frictions. Roger and Vlcek (2012a) take stock of existing 
DSGE models used by central banks and highlight the need to include more 
heterogeneous behaviour of both financial and non-financial agents in these 
models. The authors identify a number of priorities for modelling going 
forward, including: a motivation for households and firms to manage liquidity 
risk; explicit links between non-financial firm default and bank losses; inclusion 
of a wider range of financial firms (in particular, ‘shadow’ banks); and, explicit 
incorporation of wholesale funding and interbank markets. The importance of 
these developments is evident as DSGE models are increasingly used for 
macro-financial analysis and forecasting, macroprudential analysis and the 
stress-testing of banks’ balance sheets. 
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2.1.2 Other estimates and approaches 
In addition to research published to support the development and calibration 
of Basel III, there have been a number of independent studies of the expected 
macroeconomic costs and benefits of prudential regulation.  
Ahead of the Basel III final calibration, the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF) published (IIF (2010)) an assessment of the expected effects of 
prudential regulatory reform on macroeconomic output and employment in the 
US, euro area and Japan. The report estimated that the total impact of the 
regulatory package would be to reduce real GDP for the G3 countries by 3.1 
percentage points (from a no-policy baseline). These results, however, 
assumed a far more rapid implementation of Basel III than was eventually 
proposed.  
The IIF revisited this assessment (IIF, 2011) subsequent to the publication of 
the revised Basel III policy, and calculated a smaller, but still significant, 
impact on economic output. This study calculated the impact of Basel III over 
the period 2011 to 2015 for the G3 countries plus Switzerland and the UK. 
They estimate that the whole package could reduce real GDP across the G3, 
Switzerland and the UK by between 1½ and 3 percentage points from the 
no-policy baseline. The methodology is sensitive to non-empirical parameter 
assumptions that determine the price of bank equity in their model. In 
particular, the chosen parameters for the UK result in the cost of equity rising 
by a maximum of around 18 percentage points (from 18% in the baseline to 
36%), leading to a large contraction in lending. While the two studies from the 
IIF are not strictly comparable, they do remind us that the speed of 
implementation will raise the costs of the policy package. 
A recent study of the macroeconomic costs and benefits of prudential 
standards by Miles et al. (2011) abstracts from estimating the impact of the 
specific prudential policy calibrations and seeks instead to determine the 
optimal capital level for the banking system. To estimate the cost to banks of 
higher capital requirements, the authors first estimate the reduction in banks’ 
return on equity as banks become better capitalised and balance sheet 
leverage (and risk) is reduced using a modified CAPM approach. This result is 
then used to calculate the expected change in bank’s weighted average cost 
of capital as banks’ capital ratios change. 
Changes in banks’ weighted average cost of capital are assumed to be 
passed on to non-financial firms through the cost of borrowing. A structural 
production function equation is used to estimate the cost of a change in 
banks’ capital ratios on GDP. The study finds that this cost rises linearly as 
banks’ capital ratios increase, such that the marginal cost of raising banks’ 
capital ratios is constant, at around 1.5% of GDP. To calculate the benefits of 
prudential standards, the authors consider the distribution of historical shocks 
to GDP (and, by realistic assumption, bank assets) and estimate the levels of 
capital that would be required for the banking system to survive these shocks 
and, therefore, avoid a financial crisis. The distribution of historical shocks 
exhibits diminishing marginal benefits as banks’ capital ratios increase, 
although the distribution is non-normal and somewhat skewed (towards higher 
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negative shocks). Comparing the marginal costs to the benefits, the optimal 
tier 1 capital ratio is estimated to be in the 16% to 20% range. 
2.2 Some uncertainties 
Existing empirical approaches to modelling the effects of prudential regulation, 
including our own, focus on the links between higher capital and liquidity 
standards in the banking sector and the macroeconomy. However, the 
literature also highlights a number of important uncertainties in analysing the 
effects of prudential regulation. In this section, we highlight three issues: the 
extent to which new prudential policy changes the size of future crises, the 
interconnectedness of the banking system, and the effectiveness of 
competition within it.  
There are several reasons to believe that changes in regulatory standards 
may directly affect the size of any future crisis. Hanson, Kashyap and Stein 
(2011) argue that, in a model with coordination failures leading to fire sales 
and lending constraints, banks in aggregate hold inadequate capital buffers in 
good times and have (private) incentives to shrink assets (including lending), 
rather than raise additional new capital, in the event of a system-wide crisis. 
These incentives to rein in lending in a downturn may be further exacerbated 
by: the procyclicality of risk-weighted asset measures (Goodhart et al (2004); 
BCBS (2011a)); and, the premium on raising external equity (relative to 
retained earnings) that banks may face due to equity issuance being 
perceived as a negative signal by outside investors (Myers and Majluf (1984)). 
Higher capital buffers, time-varying regulatory buffers and contingent capital 
instruments may reduce the size of the banking crises and the depth of 
subsequent recessions by mitigating fire sale incentives and the lending 
bottleneck effects described above. However, the empirical literature on these 
effects is scarce. The LEI report (BCBS (2010a)) fails to find a statistically 
significant empirical relationship between prudential standards and severity of 
crises, possibly due to a very small number of available observations. 
The effects of the new regulatory requirements on the size of the crises can 
also be analysed by exploring the structural stability of different banking 
networks and the transmission of shocks through the banking system using 
mathematical network models.1 Some recent literature in this field explicitly 
considers the connections between prudential regulation and systemic 
stability using such network models. For example, Nier et al. (2008) suggests 
that higher capital levels in a network that has high levels of interbank 
connectivity (each bank is connected to a large number of other banks via 
interbank assets and liabilities) can increase resilience against contagious 
defaults. The model also suggests that a more concentrated banking sector 
can be more vulnerable to systemic risk as the size of interbank liabilities to 
any particular institution rise, even when banks are appropriately capitalised. 
These results are highly sensitive to the theoretical specification of the 
network in the model. 
                                            
1
 These mathematical models have been adapted from other disciplines, such as the 
biological sciences examining the spread of disease through a population. 
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Using an alternative credit network model, Battison et al. (2009) argue for a 
different conclusion, namely that systemic fragility starts to rise once 
connectivity in the banking sector increases beyond a certain level because a 
shock to an individual node can feed back through that node’s connections 
and amplify the effect to a full systemic crisis. Gai and Kapadia (2010) also 
find that, conditional on a single institution failing, higher concentration 
increases contagion in the network, potentially leading crises to be more 
widespread if they occur.  
Despite modelling sensitivities, financial network analysis appears to be an 
important tool for assessing the benefits of new prudential standards, 
especially for policy initiatives aimed directly at reducing systemic risk, such 
as additional capital surcharges for systemically important banks or regulatory 
incentives for central counterparty clearing. For example, the recent paper by 
Haldane and May (2011) suggests that the stability of financial networks 
depends on the heterogeneity in banks’ diversification choices. This implies 
that some consideration needs to be given to whether competitive pressures 
and regulatory arbitrage incentives induced by new prudential standards are 
likely to generate similar portfolio allocation choices by banks in the system 
(since these could undermine or at any rate reduce the anticipated outcomes 
of the standards). 
A relatively unexplored area that may significantly affect the costs and 
benefits of the new prudential standards is interaction between regulatory 
changes and competition in the banking sector. For example, reduced 
competition has generally been associated with higher loan spreads 
(Ruthenberg and Landskroner (2008); BCBS (2011a)). If the current increase 
in capital and liquidity requirements creates additional barriers to entry or 
results in a more concentrated banking industry, it may amplify the 
macroeconomic costs of the regulatory reform as firms may be more able to 
pass on regulatory costs to the economy as a whole or extract additional rents 
through wider loan spreads. We note, however, that this effect may already be 
partly captured by the reduced-form empirical models of the relationship 
between lending spreads and capital requirements unless they explicitly 
control for competition.  
The likelihood and the size of the financial crisis, and therefore the estimates 
of the benefits, are also likely to be affected if the new prudential standards 
materially change the nature of competition in the relevant markets. For 
example, Vives (2010) undertakes a detailed review of the literature on bank 
competition and financial fragility and concludes that there exists a trade-off 
between competition and stability. Vives finds that coordination problems 
between investors and depositors worsen with the competitive pressure, 
which increases the probability of a crisis and the range of fundamentals that 
give rise to a run on a solvent institution. Vives also identifies a range of 
models which suggest that an increase in competition may be associated with 
higher risk-taking incentives. A study of inter-state and intra-state deregulation 
in the US between 1976 and 1994 by Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011) also 
finds that firms tend to adopt lower and more uniform capital levels as the 
intensity of competition increases.  
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Other empirical studies provide more mixed results. Beck et al. (2006) use a 
panel of 69 countries over the period 1980 to 1997 and find that both high 
concentration in the banking sector and pro-competitive institutions, and 
regulatory environments are associated with a lower probability of a systemic 
crisis. These findings are supported by Schaek et al. (2009), who also report 
that, using data on 45 countries between 1980 and 2005, systemic banking 
crises are less likely in more competitive and more concentrated banking 
systems. These results may be reconcilable (highly competitive firms are very 
fit; firms with high market power are very strong), but the literature on 
competition and financial fragility suggest that the interactions between 
economic benefits and competitive effects of the new prudential standards 
merit further investigation. 
2.3 Conclusion 
All of the studies noted above make significant contributions to estimating the 
macroeconomic implications of prudential standards. They also highlight some 
issues that such estimates either do not or, realistically, cannot address. It is 
clear that there remain a number of practical obstacles to estimating the 
impact of Basel III on national economies. The extent to which a country is 
affected by the Basel III package will depend on a number of factors such as 
the prevalent business models of its banks, the impact of changes to capital 
and risk-weighted asset definitions on individual institutions, and the 
macroeconomic conditions in each country, an effect that is obscured by 
international aggregates. 
We are not aware of published research that focuses on a country-specific 
calibration of the changes in prudential standards and that captures the 
behavioural responses of firms to the regulatory standards as well as the 
dynamic second-order effects of the changes in bank lending on the economy, 
including but not limited to the stabilising monetary policy responses. In the 
rest of this paper, we discuss the development of the models that we have 
used to estimate the impact of changes to prudential policy, including how we 
have attempted to overcome some of the practical difficulties in making 
estimates. 
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3 A model of the UK banking system 
We constructed a model of individual banks’ responses to changes in 
prudential standards, based on an analysis of historical data. The model 
simulates the adjustments made to elements of individual banks’ balance 
sheets as they adjust to new capital requirements. We aggregate these 
individual responses across the banking sector to produce a measure of the 
change in the aggregate banking sector capital ratio. The aggregate capital 
ratio is then used in our macroeconomic model to estimate the costs and 
benefits of higher regulatory standards. 
This approach has a number of advantages. First, we can better understand 
the impact of a large number of complex policy propositions that overlap and 
interact with each. Second, the model allows us to analyse the impact on the 
quality of capital held on banks’ balance sheets by differentiating between 
different tiers (core equity, tier 1 and total) of capital. Third, in addition to 
investigating changes to minimum capital ratios, we can investigate the impact 
of changes to the quality of regulatory capital or risk-weighted assets held on 
banks’ balance sheets. In addition, this approach provides a dynamic, rather 
than static, analysis of any implementation profile for the policy propositions. 
We discuss these issues further in Section 3.2. 
3.1 Banks’ responses to regulatory capital requirements 
In the macroeconomic impact assessment framework described in OP38, the 
aggregate banking sector’s risk-weighted total capital ratio and aggregate 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets were established as policy levers that we 
could manipulate in the NiGEM model. This setup was useful in that it enabled 
us to estimate the impact on the UK economy of aggregate changes to capital 
and liquidity standards for the banking sector as a whole.  
However, the UK banking sector is dominated by a small number of large but 
dissimilar institutions, and changes to prudential policy may affect these 
institutions in very different ways. For example, a bank with a capital to risk-
weighted assets ratio very close to the regulatory minimum ratio will have no 
choice but to adjust capital and/or assets in response to an increase in this 
minimum, while a bank holding a large voluntary buffer of capital to risk-
weighted assets over the minimum ratio required could in principle choose to 
do nothing and rely on their buffer to absorb the increase in the minimum. 
Treating the banking sector as a single agent making decisions based on an 
aggregated balance sheet, rather than as a number of heterogeneous agents 
making decisions based on individual balance sheet positions, will most likely 
fail to capture properly aggregate behaviour. 
OP36 looked at the historical relationship between capital and credit supply 
for all banks operating in the UK over the period 1997 to 2007 and estimated 
a model that describes how banks adjust their balance sheets in response to 
shocks to their actual capital ratios. The intuition behind the model is 
straightforward: banks react to differences between their desired future risk-
weighted capital ratio and their existing capital ratio by adjusting both their 
levels of capital and risk-weighted assets over time until they achieve this 
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desired ratio. Annex 1 provides a brief technical description of the approach 
developed to model the relationship. 
The differential rates at which banks adjust key elements of their balance 
sheets (the adjustment parameters) are estimated in OP36. Separate 
adjustment parameters are estimated for total and tier 1 capital, total assets, 
risk-weighted assets and total bank lending.2 Note that the estimated 
adjustment parameters represent the average rate of adjustment for banks’ 
balance sheets across the whole banking system. That is, estimates are 
representative of the aggregate adjustment speed for the banking sector, and 
not specific to each bank. The lack of individual bank adjustment parameters 
is a limitation of this analysis, but reflects the limitations of the data itself. 
To demonstrate how different elements of a bank’s balance sheet change as 
the bank adjusts to its desired capital ratio, we simulated the impact of a 1 
percentage point increase in banks’ desired capital ratio using the estimates 
from OP36 and given the aggregate level of capitalisation and assets in the 
banking system in 2009.3 As can be seen from Table 3.1, the most significant 
adjustment occurs in the first year and adjustment is largely complete after 
four years. Importantly, the simulation shows that banks adjust by raising their 
total regulatory capital overall by 3.6% from the baseline. If we assumed that 
banks made no change to their risk-weighted assets, total regulatory capital 
would need to rise by 7.0% to meet the new requirement.4 
Table 3.1: Impact over time of a 1 percentage point increase in banks’ 
ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted asset ratios 
 Percentage difference from baseline1 after: 
 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Change in:       
Total regulatory capital 2.1 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.6 
Tier 1 capital 1.5 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 
Assets -1.2 -1.6 -1.8 -1.9 -1.9 
Loans -1.0 -1.3 -1.5 -1.6 -1.6 
Risk-weighted assets -1.9 -2.7 -3.0 -3.1 -3.2 
1
 Reported results use aggregate balance sheet data for the UK banking sector in 2009 
as a starting point. The regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio for this period was 
approximately 0.14. 
 
We find that the impact is much higher for total capital than for tier 1 capital, 
which suggests that banks flex their tier 2 capital (the difference between 
tier 1 and total capital) to a greater extent than the relatively expensive and 
inflexible tier 1 capital in order to meet capital targets. One implication of the 
                                            
2
 The estimated adjustment parameters are reported in Table 3, OP36 
3
 We used the average balance sheet of the four largest UK banks for this simulation 
although, as noted, this is unlikely to be representative of actual aggregate behaviour. 
4
 Say risk-weighted assets of a bank are £100 and total regulatory capital is £14 (the 
regulatory ratio is therefore 0.14). If risk-weighted assets are unchanged, raising the capital 
ratio by 1 percentage point increases capital by £1, or 1 ÷ 14 = 7%. 
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model is that rules that restrict the use of tier 2 capital can have larger impacts 
than similar changes in total requirements would suggest.  
The model also reveals the adjustments that banks make to the asset side of 
the balance sheet. What is interesting is that the composition of assets 
changes: total assets shrink by 1.4%, while risk-weighted assets shrink by 
2.4% and total loans by 1.2%. This means that banks’ approaches to 
achieving higher regulatory capital ratios typically involve proportionally 
greater reductions in assets with higher risk weights. For example, one might 
expect banks to shrink their portfolios of corporate loans, which generally 
attract a high risk weight, more than their portfolios of domestic mortgages, 
which attract a low risk weight. 
Clearly, these estimation results are based on banks’ behaviour in a benign 
economic period, and responses may differ following the recent crisis. It is 
difficult to assess the extent to which the estimated adjustment parameters 
continue to apply after the crisis due to the insufficient number of cross-time 
observations and the significantly different macroeconomic environment in the 
post-crisis period. Preliminary results we have for the post-crisis period are 
broadly consistent with the results in OP36, although we, unsurprisingly, 
observe banks adjusting to shortfalls in their capital ratios faster than in the 
past. However, there is insufficient data for the post-crisis period to allow us to 
draw any firm conclusions on whether the relationships in OP36 have 
changed materially. We also note that the parameters estimated in OP36 may 
not be wholly reliable as indicators of banks’ responses to Basel III because: 
 they are based on firm-specific individual capital guidance (ICG) 
adjustments rather than across-the-board changes in standards; and 
 some of the ICG adjustments may have similar drivers to Basel III, i.e. 
a perception that the capital required is too low when considered 
against an objective assessment of bank risk positions and associated 
externalities, while others might have qualitatively different drivers 
such as concerns about strategy or management competence. 
The first point suggests that, under Basel III, banks have a greater ability to 
raise prices and a lesser ability to raise capital than in the cases modelled in 
OP36 unless the findings in OP36 reflect considerable market power (which 
may be the case). The second point suggests that, in OP36, the observed 
tendency of banks to reduce balance sheets following an increase in their 
ICG may have a driver that is independent of the ICG. In this case, the full 
balance sheet shrinkage estimated in OP36 might not be expected under 
Basel III. 
3.2 Constructing a model of the UK banking system  
We populate the OP36 model above with data for each of the major UK 
banking groups. A change in prudential policy – in effect, a shock to banks’ 
desired capital ratios – changes the capital ratio that each bank targets, and 
the surplus or deficit of the bank’s actual capital ratio relative to this target. 
The output of the model is a prediction of how each bank’s capital and risk-
weighted assets adjust relative to the baseline over time. Adding together the 
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balance sheets of all major banks with and without the policy change provides 
the incremental impact on, and a transition path to, future industry-wide capital 
ratios.  
One advantage of this approach is that it allows us to simulate banks’ 
response to a complex set of policies that overlap and interact with each 
other. For example, if both a leverage ratio and risk-weighted capital ratio are 
included in the policy package, the risk-weighted capital ratio will be binding 
when a bank’s risk-weights are high relative to unweighted assets, and the 
leverage ratio is binding when a bank’s risk-weights are low. We can construct 
a simple rule in the model that switches between these two requirements if 
changes to a bank’s balance sheet cause these ratios to be binding at 
different points. 
Another advantage is the ability to deal with different minimum regulatory 
requirements expressed in terms of core capital, tier 1 capital and total capital. 
For example, a large increase in the core capital to risk-weighted assets ratio 
might cause a bank to shrink its assets considerably, resulting in an excess of 
capital at the tier 1 and/or the total capital levels. The optimal response is to 
reduce the level of non-core capital over time. Reducing non-core capital 
offsets the cost of the initial increase in core capital, implying that the overall 
increase in cost will be the difference between the required rates of return on 
core and non-core capital. 
We model changes in the definition of capital in a similar way. When we 
impose tighter conditions on the definition of core capital, for example by 
requiring greater deductions from tier 1 capital to calculate core capital, banks 
may respond by raising additional core capital. This will count towards tier 1 
and total capital requirements, and will generate a surplus at those two levels 
if the tier 1 and total capital minima are also unchanged. In the model, all 
layers of capital are recalculated in each period, allowing complex dynamic 
responses. 
A further advantage of this approach is that it enables us to express changes 
in banks’ regulatory balance sheets in a consistent way over time. Increases 
in risk weights, such as those implied by proposed reform of the trading book 
regime, will, holding other things equal, reduce banks’ risk-weighted capital 
ratios even though no change has been made to banks’ balance sheets. 
Changes to the definition of capital similarly result in changes to measured 
regulatory capital even if the composition of capital on banks’ balance sheets 
remains the same. This means that substantial adjustment in firms’ balance 
sheets may be required even though official regulatory minimum capital ratios 
remain unchanged. Clearly, focusing solely on changes in official minimum 
capital ratios would underestimate the impacts of the regulatory changes as a 
whole. Consequently, we use the model of the banking system to convert all 
regulatory changes back into a definition of capital and risk-weighted assets 
that expresses the changes in a consistent way. 
Finally, the model of the banking system addresses the issue that changes in 
capital requirements may affect banks differently, which could mean that the 
sectoral change in capital ratios is different from the change in firm-level 
minimum required capital ratios (i.e. a fallacy of composition). The model of 
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the banking system allows each bank to adjust independently and then 
aggregates the impact across banks, so it adjusts for changes in the 
composition of the sector as a result of policy. For example, if one bank is 
required to raise substantial amounts of capital, the model predicts that this 
bank will shrink and come to account for a smaller proportion of the sector, so 
that it has a smaller weight in the calculation of the sectoral capital ratio. 
One limitation of this approach is that, while the model of the banking system 
simulates banks’ adjustments to shocks, it is not a model of the shocks 
themselves. If banks are adjusting to new capital standards in advance of 
changes to minimum requirements we need to ensure that the path to any 
new equilibrium takes these shocks into account. 
The outputs of the model of the banking system are estimates of the 
incremental impact of policy changes on the capital ratio of the banking sector 
as a whole. These results are used in a macroeconomic model to produce 
estimates of social costs and benefits, as described in Chapter 6. While we 
cannot say that this model of the banking system provides all the answers, in 
its absence our confidence in whether we are using the correct inputs into our 
macroeconomic model would decline, while the degree of uncertainty in the 
macroeconomic estimates would increase. The model can also be used to 
produce simple predictions of the transition paths implied by different changes 
to regulatory standards, in terms of the likely combination of new capital 
raising and reductions in risk-weighted assets that will arise.  
3.3 A practical example of the model of the UK banking system 
To illustrate how the model of the banking system is used in practice, we 
present a worked example of a step-by-step impact assessment of a 
hypothetical policy package comprising the following elements: 
 a 2 percentage point increase in regulatory minimum ratios for core tier 1, 
tier 1 and total capital from existing levels; 
 a further tightening in prudential standards due to revision of risk weights 
on assets and a narrower definition of capital at all tiers; and 
 a minimum total capital leverage ratio requirement of 4%. 
Because the model requires regulatory data relating to individual banks that is 
not publicly available, we have for present purposes constructed a stylised 
banking sector composed of three heterogeneous banks5.  
3.3.1 Change in regulatory minima 
The first part of the hypothetical policy package we present in this example is 
an increase in the regulatory minimum capital ratio of 2 percentage points at 
all tiers of capital from 1 January 2011. The change in the ratios is set out in 
Table 3.2 below. This increase in minima can reflect two possible changes in 
policy that are equivalent in our framework – a change in actual minimum 
capital ratios or the introduction of new regulatory capital buffers which banks 
                                            
5
 The balance sheets we have constructed for these three banks do not purport to represent 
actual banks. 
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effectively treat as new minima, possibly to avoid the restrictions imposed on 
banks when their capital ratios fall within the buffer. 
Table 3.2: Changes to Regulatory capital minima implemented in 2011 
 Baseline New ratios 
Total capital ratio 8% 10% 
Tier 1 capital ratio 4% 6% 
Core tier 1 capital ratio 2% 4% 
 
The effects of a change in regulatory minima are symmetrical for the three 
hypothetical firms in our modelled banking sector. Under the assumption that 
banks choose to maintain their voluntary capital buffers over minima at a 
current levels, an increase in minimum regulatory ratios translates one-for-one 
into a change in the target capital position for each bank. 
While our framework permits a wide range of assumptions about the 
transitional implementation of new requirements, for simplicity we assume that 
the increase in the regulatory minima is, in effect, an unanticipated shock for 
banks. This situation can be more intuitively interpreted as an unforeseen 
announcement of new standards that will come into effect following a 
transition period that corresponds to banks’ usual adjustment period (as 
shown in Table 3.1 above). In response to this, forward-looking firms 
immediately revise their targeted capital requirements in order to ensure that 
their voluntary buffers are preserved once the new standards are fully 
implemented. 
Figure 3.1 below summarises the aggregate banking sector adjustment in 
capital and assets until a new equilibrium is reached. The model exhibits 
some overshooting of the total capital ratio during the transition as it is 
cheaper and easier for firms to flex their tier 2 capital than higher quality tiers 
of capital. As a result, banks reach their target total capital ratio faster than 
they achieve their targets for other tiers. However, risk-weighted assets 
continue to decline as banks continue to adjust to their tier 1 and core tier 1 
requirements. Consequently, banks are left with surpluses against their total 
capital targets and shrink their tier 2 capital accordingly. 
The model framework produces separate response paths for each quality tier 
of regulatory capital and uses these outputs to calculate the change in 
composition and the cost of total regulatory capital for firms. This allows us to 
translate combinations of policy measures that affect both the quality and 
quantity of capital into a single, ‘quality-weighted’ capital ratio that is 
consistent in price and quality with the firms’ current (Basel II) total capital 
measure. The quality-weighted increase in the capital ratio can then be used 
as an input in our macroeconomic model, which is currently calibrated only at 
the total capital level. For example, the two percentage point increase in all 
capital ratios is approximately equivalent to an increase in the banking 
sector’s quality-weighted total capital ratio of 2.6 percentage points, after 
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adjusting for the different costs of different tiers of capital. We provide a more 
detailed explanation of our quality-weighting approach in Section 4.3. 
Figure 3.1: Behavioural response of the banking sector to changes in 
regulatory minima 
 Adjustment in capital and assets Change in capital ratios 
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3.3.2 Changes to definition of capital and RWAs 
As discussed above, the model framework also allows us to estimate the 
impact of prudential measures which affect banks’ capital positions but do not 
change minimum regulatory capital ratios, such as changes to the definition of 
capital or adjustment of the risk weights applied to a particular asset class. To 
illustrate this, we now supplement the two percentage point increase in 
regulatory minima with the set of changes to banks’ regulatory capital and 
risk-weighted assets shown in Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3: Changes to capital definitions and risk-weighted assets1 
Source of change Bank A Bank B Bank C 
Changes to the 
definition of 
regulatory capital 
Core tier 1 -40% -20% -60% 
Tier 1 -21% -7% -27% 
Total -4% 0% -2% 
Changes to risk weights on assets +10% 0% +5% 
1
 Table shows the percentage reductions in the value of balance sheet items for each bank 
in the simulation as a result of definitional changes 
 
The changes in definitions of capital and risk-weighted assets create different 
shortfalls against the target capital ratios for each bank in our simulation. 
Following the standard adjustment procedure, banks respond by raising 
capital and shrinking risk-weighted assets in proportion with their identified 
capital deficits. The idiosyncratic impact of these regulatory measures implies 
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different adjustment paths and increases in ‘old-definition’ capital ratios for 
each firm in the modelled banking sector (see Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). As 
with changes to regulatory minimum capital requirements, we assume that 
these changes to capital and risk-weighted asset definitions are unanticipated 
and not known to banks until the beginning of 2013. We note that imposing 
different implementation dates will affect the transition path for banks’ balance 
sheets, although the equilibrium outcome in the long-run is unaffected. 
In combination with the increase in regulatory capital ratios discussed in 
Section 3.3.1, the changes to capital definitions and risk-weighted assets 
increase the quality-weighted capital ratio by 5.7 percentage points for 
Bank A, 2.8 percentage points for Bank B and 4.6 percentage points for 
Bank C. Aggregating across these behavioural responses, we obtain a sector-
wide change in the quality-weighted capital ratio of 4.0 percentage points. We 
note that this calculation raises the size of the adjustment that banks need to 
make that is not captured by the changes in the minimum ratios. Without this 
adjustment, we would considerably underestimate the impact of the entire 
policy package on the banking system. 
3.3.3 Including a leverage ratio 
We now extend further the policy package examined in Sections 3.3.1 and 
3.3.2 above to include a minimum leverage ratio6 requirement of 4%. Given 
that the leverage ratio has not been a binding requirement for UK banks, we 
do not have empirical estimates of the likely voluntary buffers firms may hold 
over minimum capital leverage ratios. For this analysis, we assume that all 
banks aim to hold a constant voluntary buffer of 1% of total assets over the 
minimum leverage ratio requirement. 
We estimate the impact of the leverage ratio requirement by converting the 
amount of capital required for compliance (including any voluntary buffers) 
into an alternative implied target capital ratio for a firm. For example, for a 
bank with total assets of 100 and risk-weighted assets of 50, a 4% minimum 
leverage ratio (with an additional 1% voluntary buffer) implies an alternative 
target risk-weighted capital ratio of: (0.05)  100/50 = 10% of RWAs. The 
higher of the original target risk-based capital ratio and the alternative target 
ratio based on the leverage requirement will then be the binding constraint on 
the bank, and is therefore used to calculate the capital surplus/deficit that will 
drive banks’ behavioural responses. 
A key caveat to this approach is that it implicitly assumes that, faced with a 
capital deficit against their target ratio, banks change their balance sheet 
positions in the fixed proportions identified in OP36, regardless of the source 
of the shortfall. We note, however, that leverage ratio requirements are less 
likely to lead to the lowering of average risk weights that was observed in 
banks’ responses to changes in risk-based capital requirements. 
In our hypothetical banking sector, only Bank B’s total capital target implied by 
the new leverage ratio requirement exceeds its risk-based target capital ratio. 
Banks A and C are not bound by the leverage requirement at any point, so 
their responses remain the same as in Section 3.3.2 above. Bank B, however, 
                                            
6
 Ratio of total regulatory capital to total assets. 
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now faces an additional, binding constraint on its total capital due to the 
leverage ratio. As a result, Bank B’s total capital ratio increases by more than 
in Step 2 and no longer exhibits the overshooting effect noted earlier (see 
Figure 3.4). This response significantly increases the quality-weighted capital 
ratio for Bank B and brings the sector-wide change in quality weighted capital 
ratio to 5.6 percentage points. 
Table 3.4 below summarises the aggregate quality-weighted changes in 
capital for all three steps in the analysis of the hypothetical policy package. It 
is useful to note from the table that, while each additional policy change adds 
to our estimate of the (quality-weighted) change in the capital ratio, the 
increase in the minimum regulatory requirement remains unchanged after 
Step 1. We can use these system-wide outcomes in NiGEM as a proxy for the 
expected response of the banking sector as a whole, which allows us to 
derive the long-term macroeconomic impacts of the proposed policy.  
Table 3.4: Model simulation results 
Scenario Aggregate quality-
weighted change in the 
capital ratio (percentage 
points) 
Step 1 (minimum ratios) 
 
 
2.6 
Step 2 (additional changes in 
definition of capital/RWAs) 
 
4.0 
 
Step 3 (additional leverage ratio 
requirement) 
 
5.6 
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Figure 3.2: Impact of changes in regulatory minima and individual capital & RWA shocks adjustment in capital and assets 
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Figure 3.3: Impact of changes in regulatory minima and individual capital and RWA shocks on bank capital ratios 
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Figure 3.4: Additional impact of a leverage ratio requirement 
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4 Modelling the impact on the macroeconomy 
We have modified the approach taken to measuring the impact of changes to 
prudential policy in OP38 to include both short and long-term responses to 
higher prudential standards. In the long-term, banks can use funding from 
across their balance sheets to undertake lending, so we expect banks to pass 
through any average rise in the cost of funding evenly across their loan 
portfolios. However, in the short term, our microeconomic model tells us that 
banks shrink their risk-weighted asset levels to achieve new capital ratios. The 
most efficient way for banks to adjust their risk-weighted assets (and their loan 
portfolios) is to reduce high-risk lending, such as corporate loans, to a greater 
extent than low risk lending, such as mortgage lending. If we are to properly 
capture the full impact of the policy package, we need to take into account the 
different short- and long-run costs to the economy.  
The model of the banking sector described in Chapter 3 provides detailed 
estimates of the impacts on banks’ balance sheets of detailed prudential 
policy proposals. However, estimates of the impact of prudential policy on the 
macroeconomy are usually generated from necessarily simplified models 
using reduced form equations. Most models of national economies are also 
used for the specific purpose of estimating the impact of monetary or fiscal 
policy and most do not explicitly model the banking sector as a target for 
policy change. 
Our approach to analysing the impact of prudential policy on the 
macroeconomy proceeds by using the micro-foundations explored in our 
modelling of the banking system to build, where possible, relevant linkages 
into the NiGEM macroeconomic model described in OP38. While the 
consequences of calibrating and combining a range of prudential policy 
measures cannot be known with certainty ex ante, broad estimates of the 
consequences can be made because the results of past decisions can be 
observed and because there is a useful analogy between the impacts of 
monetary policy and the impacts of prudential policy. The impacts of past 
monetary policy decisions have been extensively analysed and elaborate 
forecasting tools, such as NiGEM, have been developed to predict the 
consequences of monetary policy decisions. 
However, while there is an analogy based on the fact that monetary policy and 
prudential policy both appear to affect the cost of credit in the economy, the 
channels through which the various measures in the prudential policy package 
affect banks’ costs and the broader economy are not identical to that of 
monetary policy. Increases in banks’ costs due to changes in prudential policy 
both raise borrowing costs and reduce income for banks’ customers by 
lowering deposit interest rates.  
The costs of prudential standards are calculated by modelling how banks 
change the interest rate margins (or lending wedge) they charge their 
customers to offset any increase in their funding costs, and the cost of 
carrying additional liquid assets. The lending wedge, defined as the difference 
between lending and deposit interest rates, is defined separately for the 
corporate sector and the household sector as theoretical and empirical work 
shows that these sectors react differently to changes in costs, and have 
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different consequential impacts on the macroeconomy. The household sector 
is further divided into secured household loans (i.e. mortgages) and 
unsecured household loans (i.e. credit cards). The cost of carrying liquid 
assets and the cost of higher capital are modelled separately in each case. 
An important caveat to the results of modelling the macroeconomic changes 
brought about by changes to bank prudential policy is that we have to rely on 
banks’ past responses to changes in prudential policy. However, as discussed 
above, past responses may not be closely representative of banks’ responses 
to the large changes in prudential policy currently being considered. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the information about the likely effect on the 
economy that our extended macroeconomic model provides has enhanced 
our understanding of the impact of the full package of policy measures. 
In this section, we discuss our modelling of the cost of capital and liquidity and 
the impact on the macroeconomy. First, we review the theoretical literature on 
the cost of capital. Second, we present an econometric approach to 
measuring the pass-through of the costs of holding incremental capital. Third, 
we briefly describe our estimate of the marginal cost of holding liquid assets, 
which reflects our discussions with the industry and inspection of individual 
bank data. Finally, we describe our method for modelling different types of 
capital, which are separated into tiers under the Basel regime and subjected 
to different regulatory treatment in recent reform proposals. 
4.1 Equity ratios and the cost of capital 
The justification for assuming a positive relationship between the capital ratio 
and the cost of borrowing is that a bank holding a higher capital ratio should, 
other things equal, be charging more to customers to offset the higher cost of 
funding (Saunders and Schumacher (2000)). For a bank, the choice about 
whether to extend credit can be represented by the following loan pricing 
equation, which says that credit should be extended when the (tax adjusted) 
return on the loan is greater than or equal to the weighted average cost of 
supplying the loan: 
  )1()()1( tOACrDrEtr DELO   4.1 
 
where rLO is the effective interest rate on the loan, t is the marginal rate of 
corporation tax, E and D are the proportions of equity and debt respectively 
backing the loan, rE and rD are the required rate of return on equity and debt 
respectively, C is the credit risk spread, equal to the expected loss, A is the 
cost of administering the loan, and O captures other benefits to the bank of 
making the loan, such as cross-selling opportunities (Elliott (2009)). The 
square brackets are positioned to reflect the assumption that the income and 
expense associated with D, C, A and O are taxable, whereas dividends 
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The marginal cost of an increase in capital requirements is therefore equal to 
the spread between the required return on equity and debt, adjusted for the 
differing tax treatment. However, this simple characterisation of the loan 
pricing decision assumes that the required return on equity and debt are 
exogenous parameters, and it therefore sets aside some of the insights of 
Modigliani and Miller (Modigliani and Miller (1958)). The Modigliani and Miller 
(M-M) theorem sets out conditions under which a firm’s debt and equity prices 
change with a firm’s choice of debt-equity mix such that the funding mix is 
entirely irrelevant to the value of the firm. 
The assumptions required for the M-M theorem (including no information 
asymmetries or bankruptcy costs, perfect capital markets, no tax or other 
subsidy distortions) are unlikely to hold fully in practice.7 The ‘trade-off’ theory 
represents one outcome that relaxes the ‘pure’ M-M assumptions. In this view, 
there are two countervailing influences on the cost of funding. On the one 
hand, the too-big-to-fail status of some banks means that debt-prices are 
effectively subsidised by government guarantee. In addition, the deductibility 
of interest payments on debt for tax purposes in many developed countries 
makes debt less costly and hence results in a preference for higher leverage. 
On the other hand, when leverage rises sufficiently so that debt-holders face a 
materially increased probability of default, they require a risk premium to 
compensate them for expected bankruptcy costs, including that the book 
values of assets cannot be realised in the market. Since this risk premium 
rises rapidly in a non-linear fashion as the equity ratio drops close to zero, the 
trade-off between these two factors suggests that there is a private optimal 
capital ratio for each bank. 
The existence of a private optimal equity ratio which minimises a bank’s cost 
of funding implies that the relationship between the equity ratio and loan 
pricing is ambiguous. Higher capital requirements will increase the cost of 
funding only when they imply a target capital ratio for the bank (including any 
buffer the bank wishes to hold to avoid breaching the requirement) which is 
higher than the private optimal capital ratio. 
One implication of this is that the relationship between capital requirements 
and loan pricing may vary as conditions in banks and the economy in general 
affect the optimal capital ratio of banks. For example, Berger (1995) offers 
evidence that widespread bank failures and recession in the late 1980s in the 
US caused banks’ optimal equity ratios to rise, which meant that banks which 
increased their equity ratios were able to improve their return on equity due to 
a lower risk premium on their debt repayments. If regulatory capital 
requirements in such circumstances are less than the banks’ private optimal 
capital ratios, they will have little incremental impact on banks’ cost of funding. 
That said, if banks’ private optimum capital ratios vary with economic 
conditions, then higher capital requirements fixed through time could become 
binding as economic circumstances change. Moreover, the substantial 
                                            
7
 We do not offer a review on these assumptions or a detailed description of possible 
deviations from them. A number of good summaries already exist (e.g. Berger (1995); Hillier 
et al (2008)). Eichberger and Harper (1997) also provides a useful discussion of the 
implications of the M-M theory. 
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increases in regulatory capital requirements envisaged in Basel III appear to 
set ratios in excess of banks’ private optimal capital ratio. 
Theoretically, negative externalities associated with bank failure suggest that 
regulatory capital requirements should be higher than banks’ private optimal 
capital ratios, as society bears significant costs in the event of a bank failure 
that are not taken into account in firms’ private decisions. This implies that 
society demands a lower probability of distress or default than individual 
investors, with limited liability, would demand for a bank. 
There is in fact empirical support for the notion that regulatory capital ratios 
were already above banks’ own private optimal capital ratios prior to the crisis 
and Basel III suggesting that, in practice, banks are on the upward-sloping 
section of their cost-of-funding schedule. OP36 provides empirical evidence 
that UK banks’ actual capital ratios are strongly correlated with capital 
requirements and changes in requirements induce material adjustments to 
banks’ balance sheets, strongly suggesting that changes in capital 
requirements are binding on banks. 
In a dynamic economic environment, further issues to consider are whether 
banks adjust their capital ratios more quickly in the short term, and whether 
individual bank’s adjustments have any impact at the aggregate level. Van 
den Heuvel (2009) discusses theoretical and empirical literature supporting 
the conclusion that banks adjust lending dynamically when faced with risk-
based capital requirements and imperfect markets for equity. In this approach, 
banks reduce their lending in response to balance sheet shocks, such as 
increases in loan defaults and changes in monetary policy, reducing their 
riskier loans in response to higher funding costs (reduced profitability), 
especially in the short term, before allowing lending to return to previous 
levels over the longer term. 
Banks with restricted access to equity markets and whose regulatory capital 
requirement is binding can rebuild their voluntary capital buffers by reducing 
profits in the future. If the regulatory capital target increases, a bank in this 
position needs to shrink its risk-weighted assets to achieve its desired capital 
ratio and restore profitability. As a result, banks with a binding capital 
constraint will reduce lending over time to a greater extent than banks with 
unrestricted access to equity.  
In an aggregate, general equilibrium context, individual banks’ capital choices 
will have a greater impact at the macroeconomic level if borrowers face 
switching costs8 and where banks have imperfect access to capital markets. If 
switching costs are high and banks have limited access to capital markets, 
higher prudential standards have a larger impact on all banks’ profitability, and 
a larger impact on aggregate lending.  
                                            
8
 Switching costs can be associated with factors such as product differentiation or banks’ 
relationships with their customers, which we observe in practice.  
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4.2 The econometric approach to measuring the pass-through of the 
costs of holding incremental capital 
In this section we provide an econometric estimate of the cost pass-through 
using the theoretical foundations discussed above. We provide a relationship 
between regulatory capital requirements and the cost of credit in the UK 
economy with parameters estimated from historical observations.9 Our 
estimate is based on regressing aggregate bank lending margins (the ‘lending 
wedge’) on the capital/liquidity ratio and other factors that may account for the 
variation in the lending wedge, such as asset risk. We also use an error-
correction structure in the equation, which allows us to examine different 
short- and long-term responses. An advantage of this approach is that it uses 
historical data about levels of disintermediation and variations in the return on 
equity to reflect changes in bank risk. Hence, it can be seen as an ex-post 
measure of the cost of capital that takes into account market feedback. 
First, we consider the long-term impact. Our estimate of the long-term cost 
pass-through relationship is shown in Table 4.1. We regressed the average 
lending wedge for all bank loans on the average bank capital ratio and other 
relevant economic factors (including economic activity, loan arrears and 
corporate insolvencies) and find that 1% increase in leverage ratio leads to a 
9.4 basis points long-term increase in the average lending wedge.  Annex 2 
presents alternative measures of the cost pass-through based on accounting 
methods. The estimate in Table 4.1 is well within the range of the estimates 
calculated using the accounting approach. 
Table 4.1: Average long-term cost pass-through equation 
 
Long run regression 
 
Integration tests  
MacKinnon approximate 
p-value1 
 Coefficient t-statistic Level Difference 
Dependent variable: Lending wedge 0.761 0.000 
Capital ratio 0.094 2.99 0.127 0.000 
Insolvencies 0.495 5.02 0.876 0.003 
Arrears 0.295 4.87 0.773 0.001 
GDP gap 3.185 3.37 0.972 0.000 
Net personal wealth to 
income ratio 0.036 1.94 0.700 0.000 
Cointegration test of entire equation  0.00452  
F-statistic (5, 69) 121.39    
Adjusted R-squared 0.8905    
Period 1992Q2-2010Q3   
Note(s): equation estimate over the period Q2 1992 to Q3 2010 
1
 The MacKinnon approximate p-values provide a test of cointegration. The Level statistic shows the 
probability that the variable is integrated of degree 1, i.e. I(1). The Difference statistic shows the 
probability that the variable is integrated of a higher order, I(>1) 
2
 The MacKinnon Level statistic for the order of integration for the entire equation. 
 
We also take into account the difference in banks’ short-term responses to 
changes in their costs. As discussed in Section 4.1, banks find it difficult to 
raise equity in the short term, reducing instead the amount of more risky 
                                            
9
 This approach is based on a modified version of the model described in OP38. 
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lending to adjust to new capital ratios. We estimated short-term lending wedge 
equations for both the corporate and household sectors, which showed that 
banks increase the lending wedge for the corporate sector to a greater extent 
than for the household sector over the short term. This result should not be 
surprising, as corporate lending on average attracts a much higher regulatory 
risk weight than lending to households (which is dominated by mortgages). 
We also expect that demand elasticities for loans will be higher for the 
corporate than for the household sector, meaning that increases in the 
corporate lending wedge are more helpful to banks wanting to reduce the size 
of risk-weighted assets on their balance sheets. The lending wedge equations 
estimated in OP38 incorporated these effects, showing that banks increase 
the lending wedge for the corporate sector to a greater extent than for the 
household sector as capital ratios rise. 
We continue to use the relationships estimated in OP38 in our simulations 
over the period in which banks are adjusting to the Basel III requirements. 
Once banks have fully adjusted to Basel III, we assume that they rebalance 
their portfolios such that increases in the cost of funding are applied evenly 
across both the corporate and household sectors. The model uses a short-
term cost pass-through, ceteris paribus, of 6.7 basis points for the household 
sector, and 19 basis points for the corporate sector for each 1 percentage 
point increase the aggregate capital ratio. The long-run pass through of 9.4 
basis points for both the corporate and household sectors is then applied. 
Intuitively this makes sense as all of a bank’s lending activities face the same 
average funding costs once adjustment to new capital levels has been 
achieved (in the long run). A limitation of this approach is that we do not have 
integrated short- and long-run equations for the corporate and household 
lending wedges. We highlight linking the short and long run relationships 
together, possibly within a VEC framework10, as a key area for development 
going forward. 
4.2.1 Some caveats to our approach 
The estimate of the long-term pass-through of costs shown in Table 4.1 takes 
into account the interaction of the supply and demand for credit in different 
markets within the UK economy, and is within the range of estimates derived 
from the accounting approach (see Annex 2). However, there are a number of 
alternative hypotheses that could account for an observed positive 
relationship between capital ratios and the margins charged by banks. 
One such hypothesis is that higher margins are associated with higher asset 
risk (Valverde and Fernandez (2007)), and that higher asset risk causes 
banks to hold higher capital ratios to offset their higher default risk (OP36; 
Jokipii and Milne (2008)). Another hypothesis is that margins increase with 
market power and banks hold higher capital to protect the ‘charter value’ thus 
created (Marcus (1984); Keeley (1990); Acharya (1996)).11 Hence, studies 
                                            
10
 The relationship could be modeled in the vector error correction framework with a single 
long-run cointegrating equation in the average lending wedge and short-term dynamic effects 
in both the corporate and household sector lending wedges. 
11
 A further complexity here is that regulatory capital requirements are a barrier to entry, 
meaning that banks’ market power may increase when regulatory capital requirements 
increase. If this led to higher spreads, it may be worth considering whether banks would then 
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which include controls for these factors could find a smaller impact of 
exogenous changes in bank capital ratios on margins, and this is indeed the 
case.  
While several studies based on cross-country panel data find a positive 
relationship between capital ratios and margin (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2000); Saunders and Schumacher (2000); Valverde and Fernandez (2007)), 
in the short-run, the relationship may be negative. For example, a number of 
studies have found evidence for a ‘weak bank effect’, since banks with low 
capital may increase their lending rates to rebuild their capital base (Santos 
and Winton (2008)). It may in practice be difficult to isolate this negative short-
run relationship from a related, positive long-run relationship.  
The general drawbacks of observational approaches also need to be kept in 
mind. These have been summarised by Chater, Huck and Inderst (2010) as 
follows:  
 any statistical model built on observational data will be correlational in 
character. Causal direction cannot be tested using purely observational 
data; 
 a statistical model of observed data is likely to be sensitive to particular 
parametric or structural assumptions;  
 any model based on observational data will be unreliable as a guide to 
what would happen in situations that have not yet been observed; 
 relationships of interest in the data may sometimes be swamped by large-
scale variation in socio-economic or financial conditions across the 
sample. 
In assessing the impact of prudential policy, we make the important 
assumption that the structural parameters of the economy that we have 
estimated from historical data do not alter following introduction of the relevant 
policies. In particular, Basel III will introduce sweeping changes in banks’ 
capital requirements and this might not be reflected in the historical data used 
for estimation of smaller supervisory capital changes. We also assume that 
our macroeconomic model as a whole remains valid for estimating impacts 
into the future. As a result, we are indirectly assuming that competition 
between banks and other intermediaries remains unchanged as a result of 
policy changes. In an economy where the banking sector is heavily 
concentrated and tends to dominate intermediation services (such as in the 
UK), this seems a reasonable supposition but we cannot say with any 
certainty that changes to the competitive landscape will not change the 
behaviour of banks from what we specify in our macroeconomic model. The 
Independent Commission on Banking recommendation (ICB (2011)) to ring-
fence banks’ deposit activities may also alter competition in unpredictable 
ways going forward. 
                                                                                                                             
choose to hold still more capital, to protect the charter value created. This would have 
implications for expectations about banks’ voluntary buffers. 
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4.3 Differentiating types of capital 
It was necessary to develop our framework to take into account the fact that 
different regulatory reform proposals apply to different tiers of capital. For 
example, the proposals separate capital that is loss-absorbing (tier 1) from 
capital that is not loss-absorbing (tier 2), and also differentiate between ‘core’ 
and ‘non-core’ capital within the tier 1 definition (Basel 2009b). We address 
this by calculating a ‘quality-weighted’ total capital ratio which includes 
changes in the required quality and quantity of capital. This quality-weighted 
capital ratio is used in NiGEM to model the effects of proposals affecting 
different tiers of capital. 
The capital regime that operated in the UK prior to the events of 2007 tended 
to focus on total capital. For example, supervisors set individual bank- and 
time-specific capital requirements at a total capital level based on their 
assessments of banks’ risk profiles (see OP36 for a more detailed 
description). Higher quality capital was, however, captured in the tier 1 capital 
definition and had to account for at least half of total capital. Hence, the 
banking sector module presented in OP38 is parameterised to total capital. 
However, since the crisis of 2007-2009, proposals for regulatory reform have 
focused on raising additional higher quality capital, due to a widespread view 
that lower quality tier 2 capital failed to perform the role of insulating less 
subordinated debt-holders from the costs of failure (e.g. FSA (2009a), Basel 
Committee (2009b)). Hence, it has been necessary to adapt the FSA/NIESR 
framework to model the effects of changes in prudential requirements applied 
at different levels of capital. 
Our ‘quality-weighted’ total capital ratio contributes to this because it is equal 
to the total capital ratio adjusted by the change in the weighted cost of capital 
that follows from changes in the quality composition of capital. For example, if 
the total capital ratio increases by one percentage point from 10% to 11%, 
and the weighted average cost of capital increases, due to changes in the 
quality required, by 20%, then the change in the quality-weighted capital ratio 
would be   2.3102.111   percentage points. Using the historical costs of 
different tiers of capital, we estimate that tier 1 capital is around 20% more 
expensive than total capital, in terms of the return that investors require.  
Our approach implicitly assumes that the costs and benefits of altering each 
tier of capital are proportional to its cost relative to the average cost of total 
capital. On the costs side, this approach is justified since the higher return that 
investors require on higher quality (more loss-absorbing) capital will be 
reflected in higher margins charged by banks. On the benefits side, the 
justification is that the required return reflects investors’ expected losses on 
their investments and hence the degree to which capital is likely to be loss-
absorbing when a bank is in difficulty. In principle, increased loss absorbency 
is associated with a reduction in the externalities associated with bank failure 
and therefore with a reduction in the incidence or severity of crises, which is 
one intended benefit of higher prudential standards. 
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4.4 Reviewing our calibration of the cost of liquidity regulation 
The Basel III package introduces new requirements for banks to reduce 
liquidity risk. Making empirical estimates of the likely cost to banks of doing 
this is complicated because of the lack of similar policies in the past, which 
means that data on banks’ reactions are not available, and because the 
liquidity requirements will vary with the extent of maturity transformation on 
banks’ balance sheets. 
Banks can comply with liquidity standards by acquiring additional liquid 
assets, extending the maturity of their funding profile to reduce their ‘liquidity 
coverage requirement’ or a mixture of both. Economic theory, of course, 
suggests that banks will choose a response which minimises the costs of 
meeting the new requirement. If a bank has greater flexibility in adjusting 
assets than liabilities, or if the relative costs of holding additional liquid assets 
– the foregone higher return on the higher-yielding assets that the bank would 
otherwise hold – are lower than the costs of reducing the maturity mismatch, 
banks will choose to hold more liquid assets to meet the requirements. We 
lack sufficiently granular data to measure these costs, however, and they are 
likely to vary substantially between banks depending on their business 
models. 
The evidence presented in OP38 suggested that banks raise the proportion of 
liquid assets on their balance sheet by selling some higher yielding assets and 
buying (lower yielding) government debt at a cost of around 150 basis points 
for each 1 percentage point increase in the required ratio of their liquid assets 
to total assets. We have used this estimate in our modelling, although clearly 
the impact of the new liquidity standards is an area for further research, and a 
considerable source of uncertainty for our estimates. 
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5 Improvements in the modelling of the benefits of 
prudential standards 
In this chapter, we examine a number of issues in calculating the benefits of 
prudential policy. We first look at the crisis model and examine a number of 
variables that better predict the probability that a financial crisis occurs. We 
also examine a number of alternative specifications for the model. We find 
that the probability of crisis is dependent on the calibration of capital and 
liquidity policy, as well as both domestic and external economic conditions. 
A further issue addressed is the calculation of benefits. Our model of the 
banking system shows that banks respond to changes in prudential policy 
over time. As our crisis model only calculates the probability that a crisis 
occurs within a given year, we need to consider a Bernoulli process to 
calculate the reduction in the probability of crisis (and hence the benefits) over 
a comparable period to that used to calculate the costs. Finally, we look at the 
losses to the economy when a financial crisis occurs, which may have either 
permanent or transient impacts on the economy. Financial crises that have a 
permanent effect on economic output impose much greater losses on the 
economy. If crises with permanent effects become less frequent in future as a 
result of tighter prudential policy, the losses avoided (and hence the measured 
benefits) will also be higher. 
As noted in Section 2.1, our approach to the benefits of prudential standards 
is based on OP38, which models the probability of a banking crisis (the crisis 
model). The early warning literature underpins modelling of the probability of a 
banking crisis in OP38 and the authors discuss in detail the literature on 
macroeconomic early warning systems. We stress here that models derived 
from this literature allow us to estimate the probability of bank crises using 
factors likely to signal a crisis, but the models do not imply causal 
relationships. The chosen specification in OP38 is derived by using model 
selection techniques on a large set of regressors in a logit specification of a 
zero-one indicator of crisis occurrence. The data are for all banking crises 
(whether or not these crises had broader, permanent economic consequences 
or not) and cover a panel of OECD countries between 1980 and 2008. The 
banking crisis variable is consistent with the definitions set out in OP38 and 
Barrell et al. (2010a).12 The model includes the capital ratio in the banking 
sector (LEV), the broad liquidity ratio in the banking sector (LIQ) and the 
lagged increase in real house prices (RHPG). The econometrically estimated 
crisis model for the probability of a crisis ( tp ) is expressed as the logarithm of 
the odds ratio at time t13: 
                                            
12
 The crisis variable takes the value of 1 in a year when any of the following conditions occur: 
the proportion of non-performing loans to total banking system assets exceeded 10%; the 
public bailout cost exceeded 2% of GDP; systemic crisis caused large scale bank 
nationalisation; extensive bank runs were visible and if not, emergency government 
intervention was visible. 
13
 t-stat significance level in brackets. 
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5.1 
 
The results above reflect the scale of importance of each included variable 
(for developed banking systems). 
Variables such as credit growth, inflation and terms of trade are often reported 
to be significant in studies that include data from less-developed countries. 
Many studies include these data, due to the relative scarcity of banking crises 
in developed economies. Thus the samples used reflect highly dissimilar 
economies. In OP38, these variables dropped out in the model selection 
process, probably because they use only data from a sample of OECD 
countries with developed banking systems.  
OP38 finds that capital adequacy and liquidity ratios are the main factors 
explaining banking crisis. A probable explanation is that developed economy 
banking systems are more likely to be regulated in terms of these variables, 
and financial regulators will have a mandate to monitor these ratios and 
implement some corrective action when these indices deteriorate. The OP38 
model also includes real house price growth as a significant factor, which is in 
line with research that links asset price bubbles to banking crises in OECD 
countries (most notably Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and (2009)). 
5.1 Crisis model improvements 
To estimate the benefits of increased prudential standards, the crisis 
prediction model described above was updated by changing the definition of 
the liquid asset ratio and ensuring data consistency across the estimation 
sample14, and adding a current account variable. We also introduced updated 
estimates of the long-term costs of a crisis.15 We discuss each of these 
changes below. 
5.1.1 Using narrow liquidity 
OP38 estimated the impact of liquidity standards on the probability of crisis 
from data on broad liquid assets (defined as cash and balances with central 
banks and securities other than shares) for all OECD countries other than the 
UK, for which comparable data were not available. For the UK, a measure of 
‘narrow liquidity’, which comprises cash, gold and government securities, was 
used. This divergence in definitions across countries results in an average 
liquidity ratio for the UK of 5% compared with a range between 15% for 
France to 24% for the US. 
To address this inconsistency, Barrell et al. (2010a) used an alterative data 
set. This data is based on a consistent, narrow definition of liquidity (NLIQ) for 
all countries in the sample. In these data, the UK’s average liquidity ratio of 
5% is closer to other OECD countries’ ratios, which for example are 11% in 
the Netherlands and the US. Focusing on narrow liquidity is also more 
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 This work was undertaken by NIESR and described in Barrell et al (2010a) 
15
 The long term economic cost of a crisis is deviation of output from its trend. 
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appropriate for assessing benefits, as it is more closely aligned with the 
definition of liquidity used in regulatory standards. 
5.1.2 Including the current account 
The crisis model from OP38 was also updated to reflect NIESR research 
(Barrell et al (2010a)) showing that the ratio of the current account balance to 
GDP (CBR) plays a significant role in determining the probability of crisis. 
Their findings show that as the current account balance improves, the 
likelihood of crisis decreases. One explanation for this relationship is that 
inflows of external capital allow banks to engage in excessive lending. This 
situation, in turn, creates greater risk of the economy overheating, asset price 
bubbles and a reduction in lending standards, all of which increase banks’ 
vulnerability to shocks. To capture this effect, the new crisis prediction model 
includes a second lag of the UK current account balance. Expressed as the 
logarithm of the odds ratio, the modified crisis model can now be written as16: 
 
5.2 
 
As can be seen from the new specification, a higher current account surplus 
or reduced current account deficit is estimated to reduce the probability of a 
crisis. Table 5.1 below demonstrates that adding the current account variable 
results in a significant improvement in model performance relative to the 
original OP38 model specification. 
Table 5.1: Comparison of in-sample performance 
 Current crisis model OP38 crisis model 
Failure to call a real crisis 
(Type I error) 
25% 35% 
False call rate if no crisis 
(Type II error) 
28% 33% 
Source: Barrell et al. (2010a) 
 
The improved crisis model causes our simulations of the benefits of prudential 
standards in NiGEM to capture some second-order effects of capital and 
liquidity ratios on the probability of a crisis. As banks’ costs from higher 
prudential standards translate into an increase in margins, internal (UK) 
demand is reduced, which lowers the current account deficit and results in an 
additional reduction in the estimated probability of future crises. 
5.2 Bayesian probability calculation 
As discussed above, our calculation of benefits is based on estimates of the 
reduction in the probability that a crisis occurs, and the subsequent loss of 
economic output once a crisis occurs. However, this is not a straightforward 
calculation between two static economic outcomes. Rather, in a dynamic 
economic environment, some consideration needs to be given to the impact 
that the evolution of economic activity has on the likelihood that a crisis 
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occurs. We therefore estimate a dynamic path for both the probability of crisis 
and the loss of output that accompanies a crisis event. Our estimate is 
expressed in present value terms. 
5.2.1 Calculating the probability of crisis 
Two significant issues need to be addressed when analysing the impact of 
changes in prudential policy on the probability of a crisis. First, the probability 
of crisis in each period changes over the course of the economic cycle. We 
therefore need to calculate how prudential policy changes the probability of 
crisis through time. Second, the crisis model estimates the probability of one 
crisis occurring in a given year but we need to calculate the probability of any 
number of crises over the economic cycle. We discuss how we approach 
these issues in turn below. 
On the first issue, the crisis model of Section 5.1 estimates the change in 
crisis probability given the economic and policy environment at a point in time. 
In particular, the crisis probability will vary over the economic cycle due to 
changes in real house price growth and the current account balance, even if 
prudential policy is constant over the cycle. Changes to prudential policy 
directly affect the crisis probability in a given period but also affect the 
economy over time, with the full effects not felt until some years after 
implementation. This generates a profile of the change in probability for each 
period of time. 
For the second issue, we need to calculate the profile of the change in 
probability given that one or more crises occurs. For each year of the 
simulation period, the profile calculated from the crisis model provides a 
binary outcome, i.e. a crisis begins in that year, or it does not. The probability 
that a crisis occurs over a given period therefore follows a Bernoulli process, 
in which an exponentially increasing number of events can occur. For 
example, over a two year period, there are four states of the world to consider: 
(i) a crisis occurs in the first year, not in the second; (ii) a crisis occurs in the 
second year, not in the first; (iii) no crisis occurs at all; or (iv) a crisis occurs in 
both years. Longer time periods require much larger calculations. For 
example, there are 1,024 potential states of the world over a 10-year period 
and 32,768 potential states of the world over a 15-year period. 
5.2.2 Calculating the benefits of higher prudential standards 
While the number of permutations generated by the Bernoulli process is 
increasingly large as we lengthen the period over which we wish to calculate 
benefits, the number of calculations needed to make a reasonable estimate of 
the overall benefits can be reduced substantially. This is because the 
probability of more than one crisis occurring within any given period is 
increasingly small as the number of crises rises. We can demonstrate this 
through a numerical example. If the probability that a crisis occurs in any 
particular year is reduced from 5% per annum to 4% per annum, we calculate 
that the reduction in the probability that a single crisis occurs within a 10-year 
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period is 4 percentage points using the Bernoulli process17. For the event that 
up to two crises occur within a 10-year period, the reduction in the probability 
is only six percentage points. The corresponding probability reduction for the 
event that up to three crises occur over a 10-year period is 6½ percentage 
points. This shows we can calculate a reasonably accurate measure of the 
change in the probability using a relatively small number of permutations. 
Ideally, we would analyse the cost to the economy of multiple banking crises 
events occurring in quick succession. However, multiple banking crises within 
a single country have generally not been experienced, so we have no firm 
estimates of the permanent loss to the economy of such events. For example, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) look at various types of economic crises (including 
banking crises) for over two centuries. The evidence they derive suggests that 
bank crises, although potentially exacerbating crises generated by other 
means, do not occur in quick succession. This may be because the onset of a 
banking crisis engenders a response from government that avoids the 
possibility of another crisis in quick succession. 
We have restricted the calculation of benefits to include only the outcomes in 
which one crisis occurs each year within the period for which we make our 
calculations. As the probability of having more than one crisis diminishes 
rapidly and the additional costs to the economy of multiple crises occurring 
are small, we believe reducing the calculation to include only outcomes with 
one crisis will capture the great majority of the benefits of any prudential policy 
package. 
5.2.3 Banking crises with permanent and non-permanent costs 
As noted above, the crisis model developed in Barrell et al. (2010a) estimates 
the probability of a banking crisis, regardless of whether this crisis has 
consequences for the broader economy. If a crisis does not have 
consequences for the broader economy, or has ‘non-permanent’ costs, then 
the cost of such crises will be very small, or indeed zero, in terms of the loss 
to GDP. Only crises that impose permanent costs on the economy will 
therefore be pertinent for calculating the benefits of higher prudential 
standards. We therefore need to incorporate in the benefits calculation both 
an estimate of the GDP losses that are likely to occur from a banking crisis 
with permanent effects, and an estimate of how frequently such crisis are 
vis-à-vis crises with non-permanent costs. 
An estimate of the loss to GDP of crises with permanent effects is based on a 
detailed literature survey on the depth and length of historical crises, 
combined with original research carried out by NIESR (Barrell et al (2010c)). 
Specifically, we calculate the costs of a banking crisis as the cumulative loss 
in GDP derived from comparing the path of GDP in the absence of a crisis 
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with a GDP path that includes post-crisis recession, subsequent recovery but 
a permanently lower level of GDP due to a reduction in trend productivity – the 
so-called ‘scarring effect of a crisis’ (Barrell and Kirby (2009) and Barrell 
(2009)). Over the long-term, our estimate shows a permanent reduction in the 
level of GDP of around 3 per cent compared to a scenario in which a crisis 
does not occur.  
The LEI report (BCBS (2010a)) includes a literature review of the long-term 
impact of financial crises. According to this analysis, for those crises that have 
only temporary effects, the improvement in GDP as the economy recovers 
from the crisis is enough to undo most, if not all, of the losses that occur 
during the crisis period. Only crises that have permanent effects generate 
significant, cumulative losses in GDP. Because of this possible pattern of 
recovery in GDP, many studies find negligible or no cumulative losses. Barrell 
(2009) found that permanent losses are statistically significant in only one in 
four crises in developed countries through the period 1980 to 1995. 
It seems likely that in future a greater proportion banking crises will be 
systemic crises, given the increased interconnectedness of the global banking 
system and capital mobility18. For our calculation of the benefits we adjust the 
ratio from Barrell (2009) so that one in three banking crises leads to a 
permanent fall in GDP. We discuss in section 7 the impact that different 
assumptions for this ratio have on our measure of the benefits. 
5.3 Alternative formulations of the crisis model 
In addition to the changes to the crisis model discussed above, we considered 
further changes that theoretical, empirical or practical considerations 
suggested might be important. However, they have not been incorporated in 
the final version of the model because empirical assessment using the 
database of 14 OECD countries over the period between 1980 and 2008 
showed the effects to be statistically insignificant. Below we describe the 
further changes considered. Table 5.2 shows the degree to which each of 
these changes explained the sample data.  
5.3.1 Wholesale funding intensity 
The ratio of customer deposits to loans (CDLR) is a proxy for funding liquidity 
risk as a ratio below one implies each unit of loans is not fully covered by 
customer deposits, which are considered to be ‘sticky’ in most circumstances. 
So a higher ratio implies that banks are less likely to run out of funding for 
their lending, whereas a lower ratio suggests a greater reliance on short term 
wholesale funding, which is considered to be volatile and prone to sudden 
withdrawal19. In the run up to a crisis, rapidly expanding loan books may push 
banks to a higher than normal reliance on wholesale funding. The first 
                                            
18
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) note that there is a correlation between periods of high 
international capital mobility and banking crises, and argue that financial innovation is a 
variant of the (capital) liberalisation process. There has been a sharp increase in international 
capital mobility in recent years, and consequently the proportion of countries involved in 
banking crises. 
19
 There are some exceptions to this. For more details see Barrell et al (2010d). 
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difference in the ratio of customer deposits to loans is a variable that might 
reasonably be used to test this hypothesis.  
Table 5.2 below shows the results of adding wholesale funding intensity to the 
original crisis model, through the lagged value of the yearly change in the ratio 
of customer deposits to loans (CDLR). This variable has a strong association 
with crisis prediction and it was a successful addition to the model, also 
improving its data fit over the estimation period.  
We also found, however, that the association between CDLR and the 
probability of a crisis disappears when the current account balance is included 
in the crisis model. This suggests that the role of CDLR in signalling a fall in 
lending standards and increased banks’ vulnerability in the run up to a crisis is 
better captured by the current account balance. Finally, the proxy status of 
CDLR as a measure of short-term wholesale funding intensity led us to 
abandon this specification in favour of a model that includes the current 
account balance. 
Alternative data specifications for wholesale funding intensity, such as the 
lagged level of CDLR, the first lag of interbank liabilities to the total deposit 
ratio and the first lag of net interbank position to assets ratio, were tried but all 
of them were insignificant20. As summarised in Table 5.2, these variables do 
not improve the model or show any significant association with crisis 
prediction. 
5.3.2 International contagion 
Barrell et al. (2010e) discuss the theoretical and empirical basis for banking 
crisis contagion. The sources of contagion stem from three possible sources: 
the first is contagion caused by direct inter-bank exposures. The second 
arises when investors recognise problems with one asset type or solvency 
issues with a bank in a specific country and this leads them to reduce 
exposures to assets or banks in other countries that are seen as having 
similar characteristics. The third emerges from economic fundamentals that 
are common to all countries in crisis. 
Many early warning studies have incorporated cross border impacts of crisis 
through specific terms of trade variables or exchange rates. Barrell et al. 
develop a broader contagion measure, the weighted incidence of ongoing 
crisis elsewhere, using GDP as weights. Table 5.2 shows the result of adding 
this variable to the model. The variable is significant although it does not 
improve crisis prediction in all dimensions. It was therefore not included in the 
final version of the model. 
5.3.3 Off balance sheet exposures 
Barrell et al. (2010b) evaluate the role of off-balance sheet exposures in the 
banking system. The rationale behind this is identifying the impact of banks’ 
exposure to off balance sheet risks, given the challenge of regulating these 
activities and the rapid growth of these exposures that has occurred in recent 
years. 
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Due to data availability problems the authors use non-interest income as a 
proxy for the return on off balance sheet assets. This approach is a rough 
estimate and assumes that all non-interest income is generated by 
securitizations and similar forms of assets that are stored off balance sheet. 
(We know that in reality some significant fee income is generated from on 
balance sheet loans.) It is further assumed that the returns on assets on and 
off balance sheet are equal21. Given the size of non-interest income, these 
assumptions result in an estimate that off balance sheet assets are typically 
around 80% of on balance sheet assets.  
The authors then recalculate the leverage and liquidity ratios to capture the 
total of on and off balance sheet assets. In addition, they incorporate the 
change over time in the ratio of off balance sheet to on balance sheet 
assets22. The results shown in Table 5.2 are highly tentative, due to the 
problem of data, but they are supportive of further investigation in this area. 
5.3.4 House prices and house affordability 
According to the original specification of the crisis model house prices bubbles 
are an important determinant of financial crises. This has policy implications, 
including the importance of monitoring rapid property price growth and taking 
steps to curb such bubbles to mitigate future crises in OECD countries23.  
The interpretation of real house price growth in the original model is through 
its association with asset price bubbles. Here we consider a different aspect: 
the impact that high house price growth has on household budgets makes 
mortgage payments less affordable, increasing the risks associated with 
mortgage portfolios. To capture this effect, a number of alternative 
specifications were attempted, including various lag lengths and definitions.  
We generated a proxy for the affordability effect by creating the ratio of 
nominal house price growth to consumer wage inflation and the ratio of 
nominal house price growth to per household nominal income. Given that this 
proxy is a possible alternative for real house price growth, we benchmarked 
these models against one that includes the current account balance and real 
house price growth. The results are displayed in Table 5.2, showing that the 
two proxies used have a weak association with crises. In both cases the 
strongest association is using three lags of the variable. However, the z-value 
for both indices ranks below 2. Both models have a lower data fit score than 
our preferred model, when fit is measured as the percentage of success at 
correctly predicting crisis and non-crisis periods over the sample. In addition, 
the models are deemed inferior to our preferred specification as each of them 
results in a lower overall Akaike information criteria (AIC) index. These results 
suggest that house affordability is not a significant factor in predicting financial 
crises.  
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 For more details and discussion see Barrell et al (2010b). 
22
 Due to data problems the data use is highly smoothed; for details see Barrell et al (2010b). 
23
 We believe that the NIESR real house price index is a valuable measure of asset price 
volatility. Its definition uses nominal house price data (averaged from quarterly data) from 
ECB, UK, US and other local sources. Nominal house prices are deflated by the average 
consumer expenditure deflator taken from the national accounts, making the real house price 
series comparable across countries. In contrast, other deflators like consumer price indices 
are not comparable across countries and make them unsuitable for this analysis. 
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5.3.5 Interaction between capital and liquidity 
A linear specification of the crisis model (see equation 5.2 above) implies that 
capital and liquidity are perfect substitutes in preventing financial crises. The 
probability that a crisis occurs is left unchanged if banks raise their capital 
ratios and lower their liquidity ratios by fixed amounts, regardless of the 
starting levels of these ratios. The rationale behind including interactions of 
capital and liquidity ratios in the crisis model is that these policies in fact 
address different prudential risks and that they are, therefore, not substitutes 
for each other in the way that a linear specification implies. 
For example, when either the capital ratio or the liquidity ratio is very low, the 
relationship between these two policy levers may be better thought of as that 
of imperfect complements. This is because at low levels of capital there is a 
high likelihood of crisis which may not be successfully mitigated by any level 
of liquidity. Likewise, a highly illiquid banking system may be very vulnerable 
regardless of its level of capitalisation. This complementarity would be 
captured by a significant negative coefficient on the interaction between 
capital and liquidity ratios in the crisis model. However, a negative interaction 
term would also imply an increasing incremental impact of capital on the 
probability of crisis as liquidity increases, and vice-versa. For example, 
increasing the capital ratio by one percentage point is more effective in 
reducing the probability of crisis when liquidity is high than when liquidity is at 
average levels.  
We tried to capture this effect in our model by using three different 
specifications. First, we modelled the interaction by including an interaction 
term (NLIQ × LEV) but excluding any other effects of capital or liquidity. The 
results from Table 5.2 show that the interaction term has a strong effect but 
significantly reduces (or removes) the influence of other variables in the 
model, which a priori we would expect to have an impact. The predictive 
power of the model overall is also substantially reduced, with this model 
predicting a large number of ‘false positives’. 
We then estimated an unrestricted model which included both capital and 
liquidity ratios directly as well as the interaction. From this specification, we 
found that capital and liquidity ratios could not be excluded from the model, 
suggesting that a model that includes only the interaction term may be mis-
specified.24 For the unrestricted model, we also found a positive coefficient on 
the interaction term, suggesting that liquidity has a lower impact in reducing 
the probability of a crisis as the proportion of capital on banks’ balance sheets 
rises relative to liquid assets (and vice versa). This relationship may be 
explained if, for example, high levels of capital have a positive effect on 
market confidence, decreasing the probability of fire sales and other market 
panics that could render a bank insolvent and thereby reducing the influence 
of liquidity on reducing the probability of financial crises. However, it seems 
difficult to justify such an effect at low levels of capital (or liquidity) and we 
have excluded it from our model.  
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 As we estimate the crisis model using the logit model, standard test statistics do not 
generally apply. We used both the likelihood ratio and Wald statistics to test the hypothesis 
that the coefficients on the capital and liquidity ratio terms were zero. The tests strongly 
rejected excluding the linear terms. 
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Table 5.2: Crisis model estimation summary results 
Model name Variable added Data Fit 
 Description Statistical 
significance 
(z-value) 
% of non-crises 
called correctly 
% of crises 
called correctly 
Original model (OP38) – – 66.6 65.0 
New model Current account balance
1
 -2.8 71.8 75.0 
Wholesale funding intensity Yearly change in customer deposits to loans ratio
1
 -3.5 71.3 75.0 
Customer deposits to loans ratio
1
 -0.6 63.3 66.7 
Interbank liabilities to total deposits ratio
1
 -1.2 66.7 66.7 
Net interbank position of the banking sector
1
 -0.7 68.2 66.7 
International contagion
3
 Weighted incidence of ongoing crises elsewhere
1
 2.1 59.3 71.4 
Off balance sheet
4
 On to off balance sheet asset ratio
1
 2.4 70.7 66.7 
House prices and house affordability
5
 Wage deflated house price
2
 1.0 71.0 66.7 
Nominal income deflated house price
2
 1.5 67.9 58.3 
Interaction capital-liquidity Lagged leverage ratio times liquid assets
2
 1.8 73.6 75.0 
Interaction without linear terms
2
 -6.3 57.4 75.0 
1
 Barrell et al. (2010b, 2010d, 2010e) 
2
 Authors' own calculations 
3
 Real house price growth is not significant in this model and so is excluded 
4
 This model uses modified liquidity and leverage ratios 
5
 These models replace real house price growth with house price affordability (a proxy for real house price growth) 
Source: Own calculations 
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6 Measuring the impact of capital and liquidity standards 
We now turn to the practical issue of estimating the costs and benefits of the 
Basel III policy package25. The form of the new capital and liquidity standards 
in the Basel III package introduces a number of additional modelling 
challenges which are discussed in the first section of this chapter. In the 
second section we set out our point estimates. We first use the banking 
system model approach outlined in Chapter 3 to calculate a system-wide 
behavioural response. We then use the NiGEM model to calculate the 
macroeconomic costs and benefits of the policies. NiGEM is a large scale, 
global structural model drawing on theoretical foundations and data estimated 
long-run relationships to model the likely path of key macroeconomic 
variables. The supply side in the model is affected by the user cost of capital, 
and investment decisions follow from the production function and the cost of 
capital. Demand is also driven by consumption, trade and government 
behaviour. Financial markets are forward looking and are affected by financial 
regulation. OP38 includes a full description of the model. The NiGEM model is 
used by both the corporate sector and policy-making communities. 
6.1 Using our framework in practical policy analysis 
In this section, we discuss a number of practical issues that arise from using 
our approach in a real policy context, including construction of the baseline, 
multilateral implementation of Basel III requirements, how the order in which 
policies are introduced in NiGEM can impact the measure of cost and 
benefits, what buffers firms will choose to hold over new capital requirements 
and the possible welfare implications of prudential policy. 
6.1.1 Identifying the baseline 
To understand the impact of any policy initiative, we need to compare it with a 
state of the world in which the policy is not introduced. This is to ensure that 
the full costs and benefits of the regulations are captured. For the Basel III 
package of measures, calculating this hypothetical state of the world is 
complicated by a number of factors. First, since the onset of the financial 
crisis, banks have been subject to a number of regulatory actions introduced 
in the immediate aftermath of the crisis in anticipation of higher capital 
requirements to be introduced with the Basel III measures. Given that these 
actions have already moved banks some way towards the new standards, 
ignoring their impact by, say, measuring the likely increase in capital required 
from the latest data would likely underestimate the impact of Basel III. 
Second, the poorer economic conditions brought about by the financial crisis 
are not typical of the environment that banks face over the economic cycle, so 
any estimates that start from the most recent data are likely to distort any 
measure of the impact of Basel III. Finally, given the prolonged negotiation 
period for Basel III, the scale of the changes to capital ratios involved and 
market pressure to ensure early compliance with Basel III, banks are likely to 
have anticipated, to some degree, the agreed higher prudential standards. 
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 As specified in BCBS (2010d) and BCBS (2010e). The implementation of the Basel III 
package by the European Commission (the Capital Requirements Directive) may differ from 
the BCBS recommendation, which will clearly change any estimates of the impact. 
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The potential under-estimation of net benefits that may arise from identifying 
the wrong baseline is demonstrated mechanically in Figure 6.1 below, which 
illustrates a stylised path for net benefits as the risk-weighted capital ratio of 
the banking system (K/RWA) rises, ceteris paribus. At point A, banks are not 
subject to any shocks and are not anticipating changes to the existing policy 
regime. Policy changes that raise the capital ratio incrementally by the 
distance AD will have positive net benefits, up to a maximum of the distance 
from the origin to point E. If, however, we were to measure net benefits from a 
later point, say point B, at which banks have already raised their capital ratios 
in response to a shock or in anticipation of new requirements, the calculated 
net benefits of a change in policy will only be positive for an incremental 
increase in the capital ratio of distance BC and a maximum of the distance 
EF. 
Figure 6.1: Impact of the baseline on the calculation of net benefits 
 
 
How should one interpret this chart? If banks raise their capital ratios in 
anticipation of new regulations, it is reasonable to attribute the associated 
benefits to the regulations. On the other hand, it might be argued that if banks 
raise their capital ratios only in response to a shock, then the benefits of their 
doing so should not be attributed to the subsequent regulations. We do not 
accept this argument since the benefits of prudential standards are estimated 
over the long term and banks will tend to relax their post-crisis holdings of 
capital as the economic cycle strengthens. For the estimates in this analysis, 
we therefore use a baseline that begins from the period immediately before 
the current financial crisis, when banks’ decisions (and economic conditions) 
were not distorted by the immediate influence of the crisis or regulators’ 
response to the crisis. We also point out that this analysis estimates the costs 
and benefits of the Basel III package, but does not attempt to estimate the 
optimal level for net benefits. 
K/RWA 
Net Benefits 
A B C D 
E 
F 
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6.1.2 Impact of the order and timing of policies on benefits 
The calculation of benefits in our approach has a number of limitations, 
particularly for the interpretation of the results. For example, although the 
order in which the elements of any prudential policy package are introduced 
does not affect the calculation of the cumulative benefits, the order will affect 
the size the benefits calculated for each policy element. 
Figure 6.2 below demonstrates this. A policy package that increases banks’ 
risk-weighted capital ratios from A to B will, ceteris paribus, reduce the 
probability that a financial crisis occurs from D to G. If one element of this 
overall package requires an increase in capital of size equal to C, the 
reduction in the probability of crisis that this element contributes will be 
different depending on the order in which we calculate the effect. Calculating 
this element first within the package will generate a reduction in probability 
from D to E. However, if we calculate this element last within the package, the 
reduction in probability is much smaller, from F to G. 
Figure 6.2: The calculation of incremental and cumulative benefits 
 
 
This means that we need to interpret with care the benefits we calculate using 
the crisis model. We cannot calculate the incremental benefits of each 
element of the Basel III package, only the cumulative benefits. If we calculated 
the incremental impact of each policy individually from our baseline, all 
policies considered would have net benefits and the sum of these net benefits 
would greatly overstate the net benefits of the package as a whole. 
In addition, increases in prudential requirements will have a different impact 
on the probability of crisis depending on the initial crisis probability in the 
baseline. The lower the probability is, the lower are the benefits of higher 
prudential standards. For example, given a baseline crisis probability of 10%, 
the first 1% increase in capital ratio will decrease the probability by around 
2.75% in our crisis model. However, since the probability of crisis is now just 
7.25%, the second 1% increase in capital ratio will only cut the probability by 
just over 2%. This will push the crisis probability down to around 5.2% after 
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the introduction of the two measures. Smaller values of the base probability 
will make this decreasing effect of individual policies more pronounced.26 
6.1.3 Banks’ buffers over regulatory minima 
Banks have a number of reasons for holding voluntary buffers over regulatory 
minima. These reasons include the desire to avoid costly intervention 
stemming from a breach of regulatory requirements and the ability to weather 
economic downturns.27 OP31 found that banks’ voluntary buffer levels have 
varied substantially over time due to the risk appetite of the banks over the 
economic cycle. The findings also show that, holding all other factors 
constant, large UK banks maintain the size of the buffers they held over the 
existing minimum regulatory capital requirements when discretionary 
supervisory requirements change.28 So banks’ voluntary buffers will change 
as economic and regulatory conditions change. 
Figure 6.3 below illustrates this point with data on the weighted average 
buffers held over the minimum required total and tier 1 capital ratios for the 
entire UK banking industry over the period 1990-2007. The buffer over total 
capital ranged from virtually zero when the first Basel Accord was introduced 
in the early 1990s, to 3-4 per cent of risk-weighted assets in the early 2000s, 
before falling rapidly to around 2½ per cent just prior to the crisis in 2007. The 
equivalent tier 1 figure, over which banks generally held a lower capital buffer, 
followed a similar path, reaching 2-2½ per cent in the early 2000s before 
falling back to around one per cent prior to the crisis. 
Figure 6.3: Capital Ratios Buffers; All UK banks, 1990-2007 
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26
 Conversely, with a high base probability value (around 66%), the first few 1% increments in 
capital requirement would result in roughly equal reductions in the probability of a crisis. 
27
 See OP31 for further discussion. 
28
 The pass-through of discretionary supervisory changes in buffers for all banks (including a 
large number of small entities) was closer to 50%, which probably reflects the fact that large 
firms tend to operate with much smaller buffers over regulatory minima than do small firms. 
The higher rate of pass-through is more relevant to our analysis because of the concentrated 
nature of the UK banking sector. 
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Figure 6.3 suggests that we need to make an assumption about banks’ 
voluntary buffers over regulatory minima and buffers going forward. We 
expect that the voluntary capital buffers banks hold over the higher 
requirements imposed by Basel III will be smaller than historical levels for the 
following reasons. The Basel III requirements are expected to reduce both the 
riskiness of the banking sector from the perspective of management and 
investors (higher capital ratios reduce the likelihood of individual bank failure 
as well as financial crisis) and economic volatility (lower bank risk reduces the 
likelihood of damaging asset bubbles). Consequently, we expect much higher 
regulatory minima will be accompanied by smaller voluntary capital buffers 
over time. 
In addition, Basel III restricts payouts to shareholders and employees if banks 
breach the new capital conservation and countercyclical buffers. These 
regulatory buffers have a similar role to banks’ own voluntary capital buffers 
and, as the penalties for breaching the regulatory buffers are less severe than 
those attached to a breach of the minimum capital requirement29, we might 
expect that firms will hold a smaller voluntary buffer over the regulatory 
buffers. 
A further complication is that banks have recently increased their voluntary 
buffers over current regulatory minima, most likely for reasons similar to those 
discussed in Section 6.1.1 (existing regulatory actions, poorer economic 
conditions, and anticipation of Basel III). However, as economic conditions 
improve and banks adjust fully to the Basel III requirements, we expect that 
banks will reduce their voluntary buffers over the longer term. 
Unfortunately, we do not have empirical evidence of the extent to which banks 
may reduce their voluntary buffers over the longer term, particularly given the 
novelty and scope of the regulatory changes to be introduced by the Basel III 
programme. We have therefore made the assumption that banks will reduce 
the level of their buffers gradually, as they fully adjust to Basel III, from around 
4 percentage points currently to around 2 percentage points30 in terms of total 
capital. If we assumed that banks’ current buffers, exaggerated by the 
pressures noted above, would be maintained into the future, we would 
overestimate the costs of the change in regulatory requirements. 
6.1.4 Multilateral Implementation of Basel III 
Calculating the impact of the Basel III proposals on the UK economy raises an 
additional challenge due to the international nature of the proposals. The 
Basel III proposals will have an impact on the economies of other countries 
similar to the impact on the UK. As international economic trends affect the 
economic outcomes of an open economy such as the UK, we need to take 
                                            
29
 Under the Basel III proposals, when a bank’s capital falls below the level of the capital 
conservation buffer, the bank will face increasing restrictions on their ability to distribute 
earnings to shareholders. In contrast, the penalties for breaching the regulatory minimum 
capital requirements can include restrictions on new business, suspension of permissions, 
and, ultimately, wind-down of the firm. 
30
 The buffer for core capital is also around 2 percentage points while, as already mentioned, 
the buffer over tier 1 capital is smaller. See Figure 6.3. 
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account of the response of other countries to the Basel III package if we are to 
fully measure the impact on the UK economy of the prudential reforms. 
NiGEM is a general equilibrium world economic model, which allows us to 
take account of the impact of the Basel III package on other countries and the 
subsequent feedback to the UK economy. However, we need to make a 
number of assumptions about how other countries will respond: 
 We lack detailed information on the balance sheets of non-UK banks and 
assume that regulators in other countries will require similar increases in 
the capital ratios of banks operating in their respective economies. 
 We assume that the aggregate increase in capital ratios affects other 
countries’ banks net interest margins (lending wedges) in similar ways to 
the UK. This, in turn, increases the cost of physical investment and 
household liabilities for these countries. We need to impose this ‘average-
effect’ assumption as we do not have country-specific banking models 
that can calculate differentiated effects for each economy. In reality, 
different economies will have different response levels to prudential policy 
and our approach is reliable to the extent that the average global bank 
cost pass-through is similar to that of the UK. 
 We assume that increases in liquidity standards operate in other countries 
in a similar way as they do in the UK (as with capital standards). 
 Finally, we assume that the timing of implementation of Basel III in these 
countries is the same as for the UK. 
While we assume that the size of the impact on the banking sector and other 
key variables is similar to the UK, treating these changes as exogenous 
shocks to other countries’ economies allows all other country-specific 
parameters in NiGEM to respond to the changes in demand implied by these 
changes in the international financial environment. Consequently, international 
trade and financial flows between the UK economy and other countries are 
determined endogenously to help us understand the likely impact of a 
multilateral implementation. 
6.1.5 Calculating the cost of crises to the UK economy 
As discussed in Section 5.2, some banking crises are expected to reduce 
permanently the level of GDP, while other crises have only a much smaller, 
temporary impact on the level of GDP. In Figure 6.4, we show the reduction in 
the level of GDP over time for a single hypothetical crisis with permanent 
effects occurring in each year over 2012 to 2020 compared with a baseline of 
a ‘no crisis scenario’. Each profile shows the reduction in the level of GDP, 
illustrating the initial losses, subsequent recovery and permanent long-term 
GDP short-fall from the level of GDP that would have happened in the 
absence of a crisis with permanent effects. The profiles in Figure 6.4 
represent our best measure today of all future losses in GDP resulting from a 
single permanent-effect crisis occurring in the year noted. The UK scarring 
effect has been estimated from historical data on economic crises and sets 
long-term UK GDP around 3% below the long-term growth projections made 
before the onset of the current financial crisis. 
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The scarring profile varies somewhat depending on the point of the cycle at 
which the financial crisis begins. For example, as the economy begins to 
recover from the trough of the recession following the current crisis, the long-
term scarring (permanent effect) is less pronounced. This is because banks 
have already suffered losses which are not subsequently repeated, and the 
impact on the economy is consequently reduced. The expected net present 
value of the costs of higher prudential standards will also be lower when the 
time of implementation of a prudential initiative is close to the low point of the 
cycle. 
Figure 6.4: Profile of GDP losses in each year (2012 to 2020) 
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6.2 Estimating the economy-wide response to policy changes 
We now estimate the macroeconomic impact of the regulatory initiatives to 
strengthen capital and liquidity standards under Basel III, which are described 
in detail in Annex 3. We use NiGEM, including our changes to the credit 
markets discussed in Chapter 4, to allow for endogenous changes to 
monetary policy and multilateral implementation. 
6.2.1 Macroeconomic costs and benefits of policy package 
Table 6.1 below provides a summary of the costs and benefits of the total 
policy package described in Annex 3. The entire package is expected to 
result in net benefits of £11.9bn per annum.31 This is the annualised, 
present value of all cumulative future changes to real GDP.32 The present 
                                            
31
 This measure of the net benefits should be considered in the context of overall GDP for the 
UK economy, which was around £1.3 trillion p.a. in chained volume terms for 2010. 
32
 The chained volume measure of GDP as defined in the UK Economic Accounts published 
by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).  
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value is discounted using the methodology developed by HM Treasury for 
policy calculations.33 
Table 6.1: Impact of all policy measures on UK GDP 
 Impact on GDP 
£bn p.a.1 
  
Incremental 
 
 
Total 
 
Total benefit of package2:  16.8 
Incremental costs of package3   
 Introduction of the 8-6-4 regime4 and CRD III5 2.9  
 Basel 3 Minimum Requirements6 0.6  
 Capital conservation and countercyclical buffer 1.5  
 Systemic surcharge 0.6  
 Assumption: Banks’ voluntary buffers shrink by 50% -0.9  
 Introduction of liquidity coverage ratio 0.2  
Total cost of package  4.9 
Net benefit of package  11.9 
Notes: 
1
 The net present value of the change in the annual, chained volume measure of 2010 GDP (£bn) due 
to all policy measures included in the table. 
2
 As discussed in Section 6.1.2, the benefits of individual are not meaningful as they are dependent on 
the order in which the policies are assessed. 
3
 See Annex 3 for definitions. 
4
 The financial crisis followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in August 2008. The FSA’s 8-6-4 regime 
was announced in Q4 2008 and implemented in 2009. The impact we have measured as the 
introduction of the 8-6-4 regime includes the impact of banks’ own attempts to rebuild capital following 
losses and their anticipation of future regulatory change since, without new regulations, banks would be 
expected to reverse their voluntary actions as the economic cycle improves. 
5
 The FSA’s implementation of these policies is discussed in detail in FSA (2009c) and FSA (2011). 
6
 The Basel 3 Minimum Requirements include the introduction of contingent or alternative capital 
instruments. The specific features of the new alternative tier 1 and tier 2 instruments have not yet been 
agreed, so there is uncertainty about their likely marketability and costs. In our analysis, the cost to 
banks of the new alternative tier 2 capital is assumed to be equal to the Basel 2 non-core tier 1 capital 
definition. The cost of new alternative tier 1 capital is assumed to be at the midpoint between the cost of 
equity and Basel 2 non-core tier 1 capital. The cost of the alternative capital instruments may be higher 
if markets perceive that these instruments are not significantly different from equity. 
 
The calculations are derived from long-run simulations using version 1.11 of 
NiGEM. This includes UK national accounts data available to the December 
quarter, 2010. For those measures that were implemented prior to the 
December quarter, 2010 (and to take account of banks’ actual responses to 
date), we construct a ‘counterfactual’ baseline using NiGEM to simulate the 
likely economic outcome for the period 2008 and 2010 in the absence of the 
FSA’s policy interventions. The difference between the ‘counterfactual’ 
baseline and the actual outcomes in the economy is then used as the 
                                            
33
 Discount rates vary between 3.5% in the short-run and 1% in the very long-run. See HM 
Treasury (2003) 
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measure of the policy impact from the onset of the financial crisis to the 
present time. 
As discussed in section 6.1.2, the order in which policies are introduced into 
the analysis affects the size of their individual effects as well as the size of any 
sub-packages of measures but it does not affect the total cumulative 
estimates we have made. The costs of higher prudential standards, which 
arise from increases in the cost of borrowing, rise roughly linearly, whereas 
the benefits of higher prudential standards, which arise from reductions in the 
probability of crisis, increase at a declining rate34. 
From this relationship, we estimate that bank regulatory capital ratios 
can rise by a further 22 percentage points before total net benefits are 
exhausted and regulatory capital ratios have net economic costs. This 
estimate suggests that there is significant space for supervisory initiatives to 
supplement beneficially minimum Basel standards. In making this estimate, 
we assume that banks achieve the higher capital ratios by 2019, and do not 
move significantly in advance of the implementation timetable. In addition, we 
note that the costs of requiring higher capital ratios beyond the policy package 
described in Annex 3 rise faster than the benefits, even though the overall net 
benefits remain positive for the additional capital range. Our measures also 
consider only the expected change to UK national income, ignoring any other 
measurement considerations. We discuss some alternative measures that 
address consumer welfare and wellbeing in Section 6.2.3 below.  
One important result observed in our estimates is that the adoption of Basel III 
in other jurisdictions reduces its overall cost to the UK economy relative to 
unilateral implementation. This seems counterintuitive. However, 
simultaneous implementation of Basel III in other countries reduces world 
trade activity and internationally-driven inflation, allowing easier monetary 
policy in the UK. This stimulus to the UK economy, relative to unilateral 
implementation, from reduced inflation and interest rates more than offsets the 
depressing effect on UK exports of others’ implementation of Basel III and 
therefore lowers the overall cost of Basel III to the UK economy.35 
There is a wide degree of uncertainty around the point estimates shown in this 
section. We estimate that the net benefits could be as low as £4bn per annum 
but as high as £66bn per annum if we calculate a 90% confidence interval 
around our central estimate using stochastic simulation methods. This 
calculation provides confidence that the policy package we estimate does, in 
fact, generate net benefits to the UK economy. However, our confidence that 
net benefits will be achieved will be considerably lower if regulatory capital 
ratios rise significantly beyond the Basel III requirements. Note that the range 
for our central estimate is skewed towards higher benefits because the 
                                            
34
 While we expect that our measure of net benefits is appropriate, we note that our 
methodology may mis-identify some costs and benefits. For example, some lending 
undertaken by banks ahead of the crisis may have been non-productive and reducing this 
lending would represent a benefit, rather than a cost, as calculated in our methodology. 
However, reducing non-productive lending should also lower the probability a crisis occurs, 
which is captured in our measure of benefits. 
35
 A more detailed discussion of our calculations is included in Annex 4. 
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probability of crisis cannot be lower than zero. In comparison, the range of 
costs to GDP from the simulations is symmetrical.  
6.2.2 Macroeconomic impacts of the transition to Basel III 
We now turn to the impact that the Basel III policy package is expected to 
have on the UK economy. We distinguish between: actual outcomes in the 
UK; and our simulations of both the forward looking baseline; and the forward 
looking counterfactual (that includes the policy package). 
The Basel III requirements initially affect the cost and volume of lending as 
banks widen their interest margins, and corporate and household demand for 
loans reduces in response. On average, the lending wedge for the UK 
economy rises by 67 basis points once banks have fully adjusted their 
balance sheets to the Basel III requirements. However, the short-term impact 
on the corporate lending wedge is much higher, rising by 126 basis points by 
December 2017, before slowly falling to the long-run average of 67 basis 
points. Household borrowing costs increase continuously over the period. 
As discussed in section 4.2, banks raise the prices of riskier corporate loans 
more than the prices of less risky, household loans as it allows them to adjust 
their risk-weighted assets more efficiently in the short term. Secured mortgage 
loans predominate in household lending and enjoy a low regulatory risk 
weight. Most lending to corporations (for investment, trade and cash-flow 
financing) is unsecured and therefore attracts a greater risk weight. 
Figure 6.5: Long term effects of Basel III on UK lending 
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Figure 6.5 above shows the impact on UK borrowing through time for both the 
corporate and household sectors. In the long-run, the annual growth of the 
banks’ entire lending portfolio (corporate and household lending) is 
unaffected, reaching this equilibrium point around 2025. In aggregate, total 
bank lending is reduced by a maximum of around 1 percentage point in the 
short term. This contrasts with a larger reduction from the baseline of around 
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3½ percentage points for corporate lending, achieved around 2015. The 
impacts on economic activity of reduced lending lag the lending reductions by 
about two years. 
The changes in borrowing costs and loan allocation affect the macroeconomic 
environment in two distinct ways: via inter-temporal consumption smoothing 
and long-term investment. As discussed in OP38, even as households face 
higher costs of borrowing, the reduction in consumer expenditure is smaller 
and stems from a reduction in real house prices. Other effects include the 
impact of changes in economic activity on prices and inflation, real interest 
rates, asset prices, and central banks’ decisions on base interest rates. These 
second order effects impact on consumers’ perceptions of long-term wealth 
and financial decisions and on decisions made by businesses. It takes some 
time for the new equilibrium to evolve. 
The increased borrowing costs for corporations raise the cost of physical 
investment, and total investment and total capital in the UK is reduced. The 
reduction in business investment also has a direct impact on the equilibrium 
level of output. Figure 6.6 below shows the estimated impact of Basel III on 
growth in consumer expenditure and business investment.  
Figure 6.6: Effects of Basel III on UK domestic demand 
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A comparison of Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 shows that the impact on total 
bank lending to corporations is far more pronounced than the impact on 
business investment itself. This, most likely, reflects firms’ ability to access 
alternative sources of funding for business investment. As noted in OP38, 
there is a strong empirical relationship between changes in bank lending 
margins (represented by the lending wedge) and the corporate bond markets. 
This outcome could reflect substitution between bank lending and alternative 
sources of funds, such as bond markets or shadow banks. 
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The relationship between bank lending and bond markets is not, however, 
straightforward. As banks adjust to higher capital requirements by raising 
equity and reducing lending, they are also reducing the amount of debt on 
their balance sheets (and hence their participation in bond markets). There 
are therefore likely to be a number of offsetting influences on prices (and 
quantities) in bank lending, bond and equity markets. First, as banks raise 
additional equity, they push up equity prices at the margin, thus increasing the 
cost of equity finance for other firms. So other firms may look to rebalance 
their funding mix by raising additional debt funding. Secondly, as banks raise 
their lending charges, they reduce the supply of loans to firms. At the same 
time, banks are reducing their demand for bond financing, putting downward 
pressure on bond prices36. Such an outcome would make bond financing 
more attractive (at least for larger firms able to access bond markets). 
Also, changes in the relative prices of equities and bonds will change asset 
allocation decisions in the economy, with redirection of funds into either bank 
deposits or equity markets reducing the supply of funding to bond markets. 
The new supply and demand balance, and hence impact on prices, will 
depend on the relative price elasticities of the demand and supply of bonds, 
bank loans and equities. The relationships between business investment, 
bank lending and the bond markets are represented in the reduced form 
equations in NiGEM so it is not possible to see these linkages very clearly. 
This is a limitation in our modelling of the impacts of Basel III, and is a key 
area for further development.  
Figure 6.6 al so shows that corporate investment is lower than the baseline in 
the short-term, but may exceed baseline growth temporarily in the longer 
term. As noted above, this occurs because banks temporarily reduce 
corporate loans more rapidly than other loans. In effect, firms face a tightening 
of lending conditions in the short term, followed by an easing of lending 
conditions over the longer term. This dichotomy between the possible short- 
and long-term impacts highlights the fact that, in implementing a policy 
package of the scale of Basel III, regulators are making trade-offs between 
long-term financial stability and short-term reductions in economic activity. 
Banks are expected to have fully adjusted their balance sheets to take 
account of the Basel III policy measures by 2020, although the full economic 
impact materialises some years after that. Figure 6.7 shows the total effect on 
GDP of the Basel III package through time. The level of GDP is subject to 
different influences that have impacts over different time horizons. In the short 
term, GDP is reduced quickly relative to the baseline as banks adjust their 
balance sheets. The reduction in consumer loans, while smaller than for 
corporate loans, has a larger impact as consumer spending (a major driver of 
GDP) reacts relatively quickly. Once banks have fully adjusted their balance 
sheets to the new requirements, lending is less constrained and consumer 
spending recovers. In contrast, reductions in corporate lending and business 
investment, which reduce production in the economy, take considerably 
longer to have an impact on GDP. These differences in the timing reduce the 
medium-term impact of Basel III on GDP. A long-term fall in GDP of around 
                                            
36
 The banking sector affected by Basel III may be large enough to have an influence on bond 
market prices, at least in the UK. 
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0.4% relative to the baseline arises from all changes in bank capital 
requirements. 
Figure 6.7: Effects of prudential policy on the level of UK GDP 
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6.2.3 Welfare and wellbeing implications 
The calculations of benefits discussed above reflect only the impact of policy 
changes on national income, with the underlying assumption that agents in 
the economy always prefer higher levels of income. However, there are other 
measures which we could use to evaluate the costs and benefits, such as 
economic welfare or consumer wellbeing. We need to be clear here about the 
differences between welfare and wellbeing: 
 Welfare is concerned with consumers obtaining what they most prefer. 
Welfare benefits (costs) arise when consumers obtain a more (less) 
preferred option. 
 Wellbeing is concerned with consumers’ psychological state, and is 
generally based on reports by consumers themselves. 
First, we consider economic welfare. Consumers (and some firms) are most 
likely willing to trade off higher income for greater stability of income – that is, 
they have some preference for stability – giving rise to additional welfare 
benefits of prudential policy. In contrast, lower income in the economy may 
reduce opportunities for employment and household consumption, giving rise 
to additional welfare costs. Accurate measures of welfare are notoriously 
difficult to achieve. One theoretical approach undertaken by NIESR to 
calculating welfare benefits proceeds from improvements in the stability of 
employment. It was, however, only a brief theoretical exercise not based on 
substantial empirical evidence.37 Other approaches demonstrate that there 
may also be welfare losses arising from prudential regulation. Van den Heuvel 
(2008), for example, includes estimates of the welfare loss for the US of the 
                                            
37
 This theoretical approach was discussed with the FSA, but is otherwise unpublished. 
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reduced ability of banks to create household liquidity in the economy arising from 
regulatory limits on the fraction of bank assets that can be funded by deposits. 
We have no accurate measure of the net effect on welfare of the policy 
proposals under consideration here. We are also unaware of any study that 
sets out the welfare benefits and costs of prudential regulation and attempts to 
estimate them. We can, however, say that the value placed on stability by the 
population is very probably large, implying that welfare benefits could be many 
billions of pounds. This is borne out by the limited work done so far on this topic. 
An approach to measuring the additional wellbeing generated by prudential 
policy, an LSE ‘Capstone’ project38, looked at the benefits of stability39 by 
using the economics of happiness literature and subjective measures of life 
satisfaction. Figure 6.8 below shows the outcome of the LSE-Capstone 
approach as applied to the net benefit calculations published in OP38.40 
Measured net benefits increase significantly when the wellbeing of people 
involved in the labour force (whether employed or unemployed) and not 
involved in the labour force is taken into account.  
Figure 6.8: Calculation of net benefits with and without welfare effects 
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These results, however, must be treated with caution as there are important 
limitations to the analysis, including the limited dataset for the UK and the 
possibility that important variables may have been omitted in this limited 
analysis. Therefore, overall, the results of this work should not be seen as 
reliable enough to be used for calibration of policy. However, it is of material 
interest that the chart shows the wellbeing benefits of higher prudential 
standards to be possibly much greater than the income benefits.  
                                            
38
 The study was undertaken, with academic oversight, by students undertaking the MPA 
course at the London School of Economics and Political Science as their ‘Capstone’ project 
39
 ‘Quantifying the Benefits to Consumers of Having a More Stable Banking System’ LSE-
Capstone (2009). 
40
 We have not attempted to update this analysis for Basel III. 
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7 Assessing the uncertainty of our point estimates 
Any modelling approach that we take to estimate the costs and benefits of 
prudential policy will depend on estimated parameters, and uncertainty around 
these parameters can arise from a number of sources. We discuss below the 
impact on our net benefit estimates of relaxing or changing our model 
assumptions. We first use stochastic simulation techniques to draw a 
distribution around our central estimate of the net benefit. Stochastic 
simulations allow us to relax the model assumptions that drive the baseline 
solution, and thereby evaluate the change to net benefits arising from different 
macroeconomic assumptions. 
We then study the effects on net benefits of changing the frequency in future 
scenarios of financial crises with permanent effects on GDP. Finally, and in 
the light of the alternative parameterisations of the cost pass-through noted in 
Chapter 4, we allow for changes in the cost pass-through parameter. A 
smaller cost pass-through is consistent with a view that banks are able to 
reduce lending charges over the long-term (e.g. see Bank of England (2010b)). 
7.1.1 Calculating uncertainty from the model equations and assumptions  
In addition to providing a point estimate of the net benefits of policy, NiGEM 
allows us to measure the uncertainty around this estimate. This is done by 
running the model under alternative assumptions and by isolating the error 
component of the macroeconomic equations. Running the model under 
alternative assumptions changes both the baseline forecast, which we use as 
the ‘no-policy’ counterfactual, and the subsequent estimates of the policy 
impact. 
NiGEM contains a number of stochastic equations which seek to provide a full 
stochastic representation of the macroeconomic environment. We calculate 
the uncertainty in the results due to our model assumptions by randomly 
assigning values to the error terms (or stochastic component) in these 
individual equations. All the economic variables in the model are randomised 
in a similar fashion in the stochastic simulation process. Given some regularity 
assumptions41, the unconditional assessment of uncertainty through 
stochastic simulation for a given variable should provide a realistic 
representation of the overall model error. The results are comparable to error 
bands around macroeconomic forecasts, such as the Bank of England’s fan 
charts of inflation and growth in its quarterly Inflation Report42. 
We implement a standard approach followed in NiGEM to generate the 
stochastic shocks for all the stochastic equations and apply these shocks to 
our policy simulation. This methodology randomly draws shocks from the 
observed historical errors43. These artificial shocks can be added to an 
                                            
41
 Forecasts error bands will be accurate when: all equation parameters are unbiased and 
consistent, and some regularity conditions of the error component hold (e.g. normally 
distributed around zero, homoskedastic, stationary and so on). 
42
 The Bank of England’s fan charts are described in detail in BoE 2010 and Britton et al. 
1998. In the Bank’s approach, forecast uncertainty depends on stochastic components of the 
equations and other quantitative and qualitative analysis.  
43
 The stochastic simulation process in discussed in Barrell et al. (2000). 
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equation over the historical or the forecast periods, each time producing a 
different model solution. This technique can provide an asymptotic estimate of 
the covariance matrix of the stochastic components if the set of historical 
disturbances is large enough.44 
In stochastic simulation, the uncertainty about the macroeconomic conditions 
that often are given as assumptions (for example future commodity prices and 
other world variables) is transmitted through model relationships. The NiGEM 
framework is comprehensive and as a result the stochastic simulation process 
can assess changes to a broad range of assumptions, for example changes to 
central bank base rates in other countries, different world commodity prices, 
or variations in overall world economic activity levels. 
We proceed by assessing the errors associated with model assumptions on 
banks’ behaviour. We then. test some of the assumptions that stochastic 
simulation cannot address in sections 7.1.3 and 7.1.4. At the end of this 
chapter we then explore the effects of changes in banks’ cost of capital pass-
through and changes in banks’ voluntary capital buffers. 
7.1.2 Stochastic bands around the costs and benefits 
Figure 7.1 shows the cumulative probability distribution for the net benefit for 
the whole package of policies described in Annex 3. The 80%, 90% and 95% 
probability bands at the bottom of the chart show the maximum and minimum 
deviations expected from the central estimates for these level of statistical 
confidence. The chart demonstrates clearly the extent of uncertainty around 
the size of the net benefits. 
Figure 7.1: Probability distribution of net benefits of the policy package. 
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44
 This methodology exploits the historical error correlations maintaining them across 
variables. When applied over a forecast period there is an implicit assumption that the 
covariance matrix will not change over the forecast period. 
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In our central estimate of the policy impact, the gross benefits from reducing 
the probability of financial crises corresponds to an ongoing increase in GDP 
of £16.8bn per annum. This estimate of the benefit varies widely, depending 
on the probability of crisis estimated by the crisis model in our baseline 
forecast. Changes in the economic environment make the probability of crisis 
shift from its historical average. For example, an economy running a large 
current account deficit or experiencing fast real house price growth has a 
higher probability of a financial crisis occurring. Benefits from lowering the 
crisis probability can be much larger for the same prudential policy package if 
the probability of a crisis is larger than we predicted in the baseline forecast 
used for our central estimate. At the lower end of the scale, benefits (though 
not of course net impacts) are bounded by zero. So, when the crisis 
probability is close to zero, the benefit of reducing it further is small or zero. 
The distribution around the point estimate of the benefit of the policy response 
is consequently asymmetric, and skewed towards significantly higher benefits. 
In the baseline case, the output loss due to higher costs in the economy 
associated with the policy package corresponds to an ongoing reduction in 
annualised GDP of £4.9bn. The baseline forecast (which assumes no 
increase in capital or liquidity requirements) is one of slow economic recovery, 
with growth rates below 2% per annum in 2011 and 2012, rising to 2½% on 
average in the long-run. Stochastic simulation generates alternative scenarios 
using greater and lesser supply constraints, higher and lower world activity 
levels, higher and lower world inflation and so on. The policy package would 
impose higher borrowing costs vis-à-vis the baseline forecast in all of these 
alternatives and our modelling approach reflects this. However, unlike in the 
case of benefits, the distribution around the point estimate of the costs of 
prudential policy is broadly symmetric. 
We find that under a benign economic environment the package has a smaller 
impact on the measured costs; for example in a low inflation scenario, where 
UK GDP grows at a relatively fast 3% per annum in the long-run, the annual 
ongoing reduction in output is estimated to be £3.0bn. If central bank interest 
rates stay low, we find that the effects of the package on the cost of business 
investment are less significant. In a more negative macroeconomic 
environment (e.g. greater energy supply constraints), the package has larger 
detrimental effects on output. This is because the model shows that in a 
negative macroeconomic environment, remedial government or central bank 
action (e.g. attempts to target higher growth by lowering interest rates) has 
only a limited mitigating impact and the cost of prudential policy remains high. 
The overall distribution of net benefits shown in Figure 7.1 is skewed towards 
higher net benefits as the distribution of benefits is skewed while the 
distribution of costs is symmetric. Figure 7.1 also shows that the policy 
calibration is net beneficial for the vast majority of the cases analysed. Net 
benefits could be much higher, more than three times larger than in our 
central estimate, amounting to more than £53bn per annum in 10% of the 
cases. The 90% confidence levels stretch from net benefits of around £3.7bn 
to net benefits of £66bn. 
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7.1.3 Uncertainty of the frequency of crisis with permanent effects 
We also tested alternatives to our assumptions on the likely loss to the UK 
economy of crises that have permanent effects. The historical evidence from 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and the observation that today’s banking system 
is a more interconnected network than it was in the past leads us to assume 
that one in three banking crises have produced permanent losses in GDP. 
Here we replace this frequency with two alternatives: a higher assumption 
(one in two) and a lower assumption (one in four). 
Table 7.1: Impact of a change in the frequency of crises with permanent 
effects and size of voluntary buffers 
 Accumulated 
net benefit 
Net benefit 
 
Gross benefit 
 
 (% of GDP) (£bn per annum) 
Assumption:    
1 in 2 crises has permanent effect1 48.4 20.2 25.2 
1 in 4 crises has permanent effect1 18.3 7.6 12.6 
Source(s): Authors’ own calculations, NiGEM 
1
 Costs and benefits are calculated for the full package in Table 6.1, including multilateral 
implementation. Net benefits are calculated as the sum of the corresponding gross benefits and costs. 
 
Table 7.1 above summarises the results of these two exercises. If crises with 
permanent effects are more frequent than we assume in our central scenario, 
the net benefits are much higher; we obtain an annualised £20.2bn net 
increase in GDP compared with £11.9bn in Table 6.1. In contrast, a lower 
frequency leads to a annualised net GDP increase of only £7.6bn. 
7.1.4 Uncertainty of cost of holding additional capital 
In Chapters 3 and 4 we discussed a number of alternative approaches to 
estimating the cost to banks of holding additional capital. We have repeated 
the exercise undertaken in Chapter 6 using a range of values for the cost of 
holding additional capital, from 4½ basis points to 11½ basis points for the 
marginal cost of holding a higher capital ratio suggested by the different 
studies reviewed in Chapter 4. Based on the standard deviation from the 
regression equation of the lending wedge shown in Table 4.1, the higher 
value corresponds to a 90% confidence bound from our existing estimate 
while the lower value corresponds to the 99% confidence bound. 
Figure 7.2 shows how the net benefit calculation of the full policy package (on 
the vertical axis) varies as the marginal cost of holding a higher capital ratio 
changes. The relationship is roughly linear as the total cost changes linearly 
as the marginal cost changes, while the benefits are broadly unchanged. 
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Figure 7.2: Sensitivity to the lending spread response to capital 
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8 Conclusion 
We have attempted to estimate the impact on the UK economy of the Basel III 
proposals. The methodology that we have developed uses both 
microeconomic models to estimate the impact on individual institutions, and 
macroeconomic models that use the aggregated microeconomic model 
outcomes to estimate the impact on the UK economy as a whole. Our 
approach also attempts to fully capture the impact of the full regulatory 
response to the financial crisis to ensure that all costs and benefits are 
properly captured. Any such modelling process is subject to a large number of 
assumptions and caveats that we have discussed in this paper. 
Given the assumptions that we have made, we estimate that the Basel III 
package will provide net benefits to the UK economy of £11.9bn per annum. 
The benefits arise from the reduction in the probability that a systemic crisis, 
one which permanently reduces the level of UK GDP, occurs. Clearly the 
benefits are not observable as they represent outcomes that are not expected 
to occur as a result of the policy implementation. The costs are driven by the 
higher price of intermediation in the economy as banks must hold a greater 
proportion of capital and liquid assets on their balance sheets, and the effect 
this has on both corporate and household investment and spending decisions. 
Our calculations also show that prudential standards could be raised further, 
by up to an additional 22 percentage points in terms of banks’ aggregate risk-
weighted capital ratio, and still be expected to produce overall positive net 
benefits in the long run. In principle, this provides some useful headroom for 
supervisory and FSB initiatives that go beyond Basel III. Bank supervisors 
might also note that, at least for the UK, implementation of prudential 
standards somewhat higher than Basel III in other jurisdictions will reduce the 
costs to the UK economy, and raise net benefits. 
The uncertainty around our estimates of the benefits is the greatest source of 
possible error in our analysis, but clearly skewed towards benefits being 
higher than shown in our central estimate. Our analysis of the stochastic 
errors around our central estimate indicate that net benefits could be as high 
as £74bn, but only as low as zero net benefits within a 95 percent confidence 
interval.  
Other estimates of the impact of Basel III generally focus only on the costs of 
the policy measures, and are reasonably close to our central estimates of the 
costs. Indeed, only small changes to the assumptions behind these estimates 
can lead to very similar results to ours, even though these estimates use 
different methodologies.  
8.1.1 Other limitations to our work 
We have identified many caveats to our research, some of which we have 
addressed directly, and others which we have noted. However, there are 
some broader caveats that could be worth exploring further as they represent 
significant unknowns in our analysis. First is the extent of competition in the 
banking sector. The empirical estimates in our modelling reflect the extent of 
competition existing in the market over the period in which the model 
equations were estimated. However, given the scale of the prudential policy 
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changes, the extent of competition in the market could change, particularly if 
higher prudential standards raise barriers to entry into the UK banking sector. 
This, however, may be offset by implementation of the recommendations of 
the Independent Commission on Banking.  
Secondly, one response to the costs of regulation in the banking sector is 
credit extension by the non-bank sector. New regulations may make past 
forms of non-bank lending (for example, securitisation) more costly in future, 
which may curtail this sector. However, forms of non-bank lending that we 
cannot predict may also emerge, which could change the structure of the 
industry. A better understanding of the non-bank sector and the interaction 
with the banking sector could help us to understand better the impact of 
alternative sources of finance when banks reduce lending in response to 
higher prudential standards. 
Finally, the response of firms to such wide-ranging reforms is always difficult 
to predict. For example, large, globally systemic UK banks will be subject to 
considerable additional capital surcharges. Under these conditions, banks 
may choose to change their business models to avoid the surcharge, possibly 
altering the structure of the UK banking sector. Firms may also alter their 
accounting approaches to help minimise the impact of new standards and 
innovation could lead to new products that reduce costs to banks. We already 
have evidence that firms are developing new instruments and strategies to 
reduce the impact of the Basel III policy proposals. Firms may also alter their 
internal models to help minimise the impact of the new policies. If these 
strategies effectively reduce the impact of the new policy on banks, the 
benefits of reducing the likelihood that a financial crisis occurs, as well as the 
costs to the economy, will be reduced. 
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Annex 1: Modelling banks’ responses to changes in capital 
requirements 
Here we briefly set out the three step approach used in OP3645 to model the 
relationship between changes to banks desired capital ratios and banks’ 
balance sheets movements. 
First, we express internal target capital ratios for each bank in the sample as 
a function of a range of regulatory and market factors. The model proceeds 
as follows. A bank i targets a desired capital ratio at time t, *,tik . Bank i’s 
desired capital ratio is a function of N factors which capture specific 
characteristics, denoted by the matrix tinX ,, , and a fixed effect for each bank, 
denoted i : 
 
 
A1.1 
 
 
The specific characteristics, tinX ,, , driving banks’ desired capital ratios include 
bank- and time-specific capital requirements imposed by the regulator46. The 
vector n contains the parameters describing the impact of the characteristics 
in tinX ,, , pooled across all banks. The fixed effect, i , captures idiosyncratic 
factors for each bank such as business model, management strategies and 
risk aversion. 
Second, the parameters n  and t  in equation A1.1 are derived indirectly as 
bank i’s desired capital ratio *,tik  is not directly observable. We use a partial 
adjustment model (consistent with Hancock and Wilcox (1993; 1994)) that lets 
each of the i banks adjust towards their desired capital ratio by some fraction 
λ in each period to estimate the long-run drivers of banks’ capital targets – the 
industry-wide factors n  and bank idiosyncratic factors t  – and thus estimate 
the desired capital ratio *,tik , for all banks
47. We then calculate the percentage 
difference between each bank’s actual capital ratio in the preceding period 
and the estimated desired capital target. This surplus (or deficit) vis-à-vis the 
desired capital position is denoted tiZ , : 
                                            
45
 Francis and Osborne (2009b) 
46
 The FSA imposes individual capital guidance (ICG) for each bank under the supervisory 
regime, which sets a different capital requirement for each individual bank in the UK. It is the 
effect of this variable on banks’ behaviour that is of primary interest in this stage of the 
analysis. To control for other systematic differences in bank behaviours, the vector X also 
includes a measure of regulatory risk (ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets), a measure 
of a bank’s own assessment of risk (ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets), a proxy of 
market discipline (ratio of subordinated debt to total liabilities), a measure of the quality of 
bank capital (ratio of tier 1 capital to total capital), a cost of capital proxy (the return on equity), 
an indicator variable to capture trading book activities and a measure of asset size. For more 
detail on these variables and the rationale for their use, see OP36. 
47
 Derivation and estimation of the partial adjustment model is described in detail in OP36. 
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A1.2 
 
 
Third, estimates of the rate at which banks adjust their levels of capital and 
assets to achieve their desired capital ratio can then be calculated by 
simultaneously regressing the percent growth in the level of assets ( tiA , ) and 
capital ( tiC , ) on: 
 the surplus (or deficit) of capital ( tiZ , ); 
 a number of macroeconomic and sector-wide control variables which may 
affect bank behaviour, such as real GDP growth (GDP), inflation (INF), the 
change in the bank rate (BANKR) and bank charge-offs (the value of 
banks’ write-offs of loans) as a proportion of total bank assets (CHARGE); 
and 
 variables to control for any (quarterly) seasonal factors not captured 
elsewhere (Q): 
 
 
 
A1.3 
 
 
 
The coefficient vector β contains the estimates of the differential rates at 
which banks adjust key elements48 of their balance sheet (the adjustment 
parameters) to reach a desired capital ratio. 
                                            
48
 The key elements modelled are: total capital, tier one capital, risk-weighted assets, loans 
and total assets. See OP36 for details. 
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Annex 2: The accounting approach to measuring the pass-
through of the costs of holding additional capital 
We would expect the relationship between the capital ratio and the cost of 
lending to be positive in the long-run if banks are constrained by regulatory 
capital requirements and face limits in their access to capital markets, and if 
customers face some switching costs. However, achieving a robust 
parameterisation of this relationship is challenging. One approach which we 
term the ‘accounting approach’ is based on banks’ balance sheets and 
estimates the long-run spread between the cost of equity and the cost of debt. 
In this approach, one calculates the increase in a bank’s cost of funding 
resulting from an increase in the capital ratio, using estimates of the long-run 
return on equity and the required rate of return on debt and adjusting for the 
effects of taxation. Then, using data on banks’ balance sheets, one calculates 
the extent to which interest rates on loans would have to increase in order to 
offset the increase in funding costs. This approach assumes that banks adjust 
loan prices only. Banks have less discretion to re-price other assets on their 
balance sheets, such as deposits, bonds and equity. If loans account for half 
of the balance sheet, for example, then the increase in the interest rate on 
loans will be twice the increase in the average cost of funding.  
The accounting approach has the advantage that it is simple and transparent, 
and it can be calculated based on publicly available data. Hence it has been 
adopted by several recent studies (Bank of England (2010b); Elliott (2010)). 
However, the accounting approach has a couple of key drawbacks. One is 
that it sidesteps the issue of how default risk affects the cost of funding. Under 
the strict assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) theory49, increasing the 
capital ratio has no effect at all on the weighted average cost of funding. The 
accounting approach can be used to calculate this outcome using the 
appropriate assumptions, but can also be used to calculate the opposite 
extreme, where the required return on debt and equity remain invariant to the 
capital structure of the firm. A more plausible estimate lies in between these 
two extremes, not least because the assumptions of the M-M theory do not 
hold which suggests that the accounting approach could be useful to use in 
calculating a range for the expected change to banks cost of funding resulting 
from higher capital holdings, rather than providing a point estimate of the likely 
impact50.  
Another issue with the accounting approach is that it does not take into 
account the interactions between bank loan pricing and supply and demand in 
credit markets. Increases in the cost of borrowing from banks will reduce 
lending, both by reducing demand for credit and by encouraging borrowers to 
substitute into other sources of credit. If borrowers are easily able to source 
funds from alternative, non-bank, sources that are not subject to regulatory 
change, then banks will be constrained in their ability to raise loan prices. In 
                                            
49
 See Stiglitz (1969) for a description of the Modigliani Miller theorem and key extensions. 
50
 Without evidence from exogenous shifts in the capital ratio (i.e. those motivated by 
increases in capital standards rather than a change in a bank’s asset risk), it is difficult to 
identify empirically exactly by how much investors adjust their required return. For example, 
investors in banks may not react as would investors in other industries, given the extent of 
implicit and explicit government guarantees on too-big-to-fail banks’ debt. 
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contrast, if borrowers are effectively ‘captured’ by banks, then banks may be 
able to fully pass on costs to borrowers. The accounting approach may, 
therefore, provide more or less accurate results depending on prevalent 
competitive conditions in banking markets. 
To illustrate the possible range of estimates, we have used the accounting 
methodology to estimate a range of possible costs of higher capital 
requirements. Using balance sheet data from the second half of the 1990s to 
the present for UK banks, we have estimated the change in banks’ funding 
costs using the approach outlined by the Bank of England (Bank of England 
(2010b)). Figure A2.1 below shows the range of estimates over time.  
Figure A2.1: Estimates of the impact on banks’ spreads 
 
Source(s): FSA regulatory returns, authors’ own calculations 
Note(s): The green dots show the spread increase (in basis points) if only UK customers’ loans are used 
to recover the cost of higher capital requirements. The purple dots use banks’ global loans to recover 
the same cost with a smaller impact on spreads. The calculations assume 10% cost of equity and 5% 
cost of debt. 
 
The graph highlights a number of factors. First, that the range of estimates is 
quite large and dependent on the structure of banks’ balance sheets at a point 
in time. For example, in the late 1990s, data shows that banks generally had a 
smaller ratio of loans on their balance sheets to risk-weighted assets. The 
accounting method calculates that banks would need to raise lending costs in 
the economy by up to 12 basis points to recover the increased costs of a one 
percentage point increase in capital requirements. Using more recent data, for 
example data from the second half of the 2000s, the calculated increase in 
lending costs can be much smaller. 
A related issue is whether UK banks seek to recover any cost increase over 
loans to customers in the UK, or loans globally. In Figure A2.1 we also show 
the accounting method’s results by considering UK banks’ global, rather than 
just UK, loans. Global loans of course form a larger pool from which to recover 
the cost increase and thus the unit cost is lower. On average the cost pass-
through falls by 2.7bp when related to global loans instead of UK-only loans. 
However, the ability of UK banks to pass-through costs on their foreign loans 
portfolio will depend on prudential and supervisory measures faced by local 
banks in those markets and other local market characteristics. 
One further issue to highlight is that the accounting method is sensitive to the 
level of the return on banks’ debt and equity used for the calculation. If we 
increase the cost of equity from 10% to 11% while maintaining the difference 
between the cost of equity and debt at 5%, the cost pass through increases by 
an additional ½ basis point. 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
UK customers only 
Global customers 
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Annex 3: Summary of the policy package 
To calculate the aggregate impact of all new capital rules on the UK banking 
sector of Chapter 6, we considered the following. Our calibration of the impact 
of the Basel III prudential standards and the transition arrangements reflect 
the 16 December 2010 agreement (BCBS 2010c, 2010d, 2010e), and are set 
out in detail in Table A3.1. We estimate the impacts of the policy proposals on 
the balance sheets of the major UK banks by applying the model of the 
banking system described in Chapter 3. The measures in Table A3.1 result in 
an aggregate, quality-weighted increase in the total capital ratio of the UK 
banking system of 9.6 percentage points from Basel II levels. As this analysis 
requires use of regulatory data on individual banks, we are unable to provide 
more detail on how we derived the aggregate capital increase for the UK 
banking sector, or provide illustrations of firms’ behavioural responses in the 
model framework.  
As discussed in Section 6.1.2, we assume that banks will adjust their capital 
ratios in advance of Basel III implementation, although there is a great deal of 
uncertainty as to the extent to which banks will continue to pre-empt the new 
capital requirements. Banks raised their capital ratios, in aggregate, by around 
2 percentage points in 2010, and we expect them to continue to raise their 
capital ratios ahead of the official implementation date. We have assumed that 
banks will continue to raise their capital ratios at a similar pace to that implied 
by the capital accumulation in 2010. This path ensures that individual banks in 
our model of the banking system are compliant with Basel III measures as 
they are introduced, and that banks reduce their voluntary buffers linearly with 
the move to higher capital ratios as discussed above (see Table A3.1). We 
note that our estimates of the net benefits are unlikely to be materially 
different if calculated using a moderately accelerated path51. This is because, 
while costs are marginally higher, benefits are also achieved sooner. 
In order to capture the likely full scale of the new prudential requirements for 
the financial sector, we have included a measure of the likely additional 
tightening of prudential standards for systemically important firms. While the 
specific calibration of the proposed capital surcharge for these firms has not 
yet been confirmed, we have assumed it to be 2% of risk-weighted assets for 
UK banks likely to be classified in the high risk buckets (referred to as globally 
systemically important financial institutions, or G-SIFIs) and 1% of risk-
weighted assets for banks in lower risk buckets (local systemically important 
financial institutions or SIFIs)52. 
 
                                            
51
 For example, a path that saw banks achieve new Basel III capital requirements two to three 
years in advance of the transition period is not expected to change our results materially. 
However, if banks were to attempt to achieve full compliance with Basel III five to six years in 
advance (i.e. by 2013-2014), we would expect costs to be much higher, and benefits 
potentially lower. 
52
 See BCBS (2011b) for details of the approach to defining systemic importance, the most 
recent publication on the issue at our time of writing. 
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Table A3.1: Detail of policy calibrations used for estimation of costs and benefits of prudential policy measures 
Measure Calibration / Description Implementation Date 
FSA’s enhanced prudential 
regime 
Minimum core capital ratio of 4%, tier 1 capital ratio of 8%, total capital ratio of 10%. 
Includes changes to the definition of regulatory core tier 1 capital (most notably the deduction of 
intangible assets from the definition) from the Basel II definition. 
December 2008 
(minima) 
May 2009 (definitions) 
European Capital Requirements 
directive (CRD) changes to the 
treatment of banks’ trading book 
and re-securitisation exposures 
Firms required to: calculate additional market risk capital requirements for interest rate and equity 
positions in their trading books and all commodity and foreign exchange positions; apply more capital to 
re-securitisation positions to reflect the higher risk of ‘unexpected impairment losses’ (see European 
Union (2010)). The size of the impact is calculated using data from an FSA QIS exercise. 
January 2012 
Basel III changes to the definition 
of capital 
Changes to: definitions of core capital (including all deductions from core tier 1 capital); eligibility criteria 
of non-core tier 1 (alternative tier 1, or AT1) and tier 2 (T2) instruments. Instruments that become 
ineligible under the new definitions are assumed to be replaced through the grandfathering period with 
higher-quality eligible instruments. The size of the impacts is calculated using FSA QIS data. 
Phased 
implementation from 
2013 to 2019 
Basel III changes to risk 
coverage 
Revised metrics to calculate: counterparty credit risk, credit valuation adjustments and wrong-way risk. 
The size of the impacts is calculated using the data from the FSA QIS exercise of December 2009. 
January 2013 (most 
proposals) 
Basel III change in the minimum 
capital ratios under Basel III 
Minimum core capital ratio of 4½%, tier 1 capital ratio of 6%, total capital ratio of 8%. The definition of 
these ratios reflects the Basel III changes to the definition of capital and risk coverage. 
January 2015 
Capital conservation buffer and 
countercyclical buffer 
Regulatory buffers are assumed to be constant over the cycle and are treated as a new minimum by 
firms since market pressure is expected to prevent them from operating in the conservation range. The 
assumption for the capital conservation buffer is based on the December 2010 Basel III rules (Annex 4) 
and the countercyclical buffer over-the-cycle value is our estimate of the size of the buffer. 
Phased in between 
2016 and 2019 
Systemic surcharge The size of the systemic surcharge has not yet been agreed. Calibration is based on our estimate of 
plausible mid-ranges for the final calibration of the surcharge for global and local systemically important 
firms: 2% of risk-weighted assets for UK banks that are likely to be classified globally systemically 
important and 1% of risk-weighted assets for banks with local systemic importance. We have assumed 
that small banks in the UK system are non-systemic and do not face an additional surcharge. 
Phased in between 
2016 and 2019 
Shrinkage of banks’ voluntary 
buffers 
Banks’ voluntary buffers over minimum regulatory buffers are assumed to fall by 50% from December 
2009 levels. 
Phased in between 
2016 and 2019 
Introduction of liquidity coverage 
ratio 
Banks are assumed to increase the ratio of liquid assets to total assets by 4½ percentage points. 
(Informal FSA estimate). Firms meet 60% of the requirement through high-quality tier 1 liquid assets 
(government debt) and 40% of their total liquidity coverage ratio requirement through tier 2 assets 
(comprising US agency securities, high-quality corporate bonds and covered bonds).  
January 2015 
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We then added our estimates of the impact of the liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR) to the package of changes in capital standards outlined above. The 
impact of liquidity standards is an area of substantial uncertainty. This is 
because firms’ behavioural responses to liquidity standards are highly 
uncertain, especially considering the wide range of assets that can be used to 
meet the requirements and the potential interaction between liquidity and 
capital standards. In addition, as the LCR specified in the Basel III agreement 
is novel, we have no past behaviour from banks that we can rely on to make 
empirical judgements. 
In principle, liquid assets such as cash and government bonds attract a zero 
risk weight, so if banks substitute them for loans (holding the rest of the assets 
constant), their risk-weighted assets will fall. This effect, however, is difficult to 
quantify since increases in holdings of low-yielding liquid assets may lead to 
changes in the portfolio of non-liquid assets towards higher-yielding assets 
that may attract higher risk weights. Alternatively, banks may change their 
funding maturity profile to comply with the new rules or hold existing assets 
constant and purchase additional liquid assets, leading to no change in the 
absolute value of risk-weighted assets. 
For the purpose of the analysis presented in this paper we assume that firms 
choose to meet the new LCR requirement purely through purchasing new 
liquid assets. Based on results from the recent QIS exercise, we estimate that 
the LCR requirement will lead to an increase in the aggregate banking sector 
liquid asset ratio of around 4.5 percentage points, from December 2009 
levels. However, these estimates are only indicative and we will continue to 
refine the accuracy of our liquidity policy calibration and our general 
methodology for modelling the impact of liquidity standards.  
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Annex 4: UK unilateral versus multilateral implementation of 
policy measures 
In Section 6.1.4 we noted that, to account for the impact of Basel III on the UK 
economy, we need to take account of its impact on other countries. In this 
Annex, we discuss how these international spillovers occur and compare the 
overall effect on the UK economy of a multilateral implementation of Basel III 
with a hypothetical unilateral implementation in the UK. A coordinated 
international introduction of Basel III has indirect negative impacts on the UK 
growth through changes in world demand. Lower demand outside the UK 
reduces exports to those countries. In addition, falls in international equity 
values can reduce the value of some UK portfolios with negative effects on 
wealth and consumption. 
In contrast, the costs to the UK economy are lower as reduced GDP growth 
elsewhere lowers international demand for traded goods (in particular energy, 
food and other commodities), easing inflationary pressures on the UK 
economy. Monetary policy responds by reducing UK base interest rates from 
where they would be otherwise, reducing the impact on investment. Finally, 
exchange rates adjust as a result of changes in interest rate differentials 
which has additional demand and price effects. The NiGEM model includes all 
these interactions through econometrically estimated equations and 
up-to-date data-based international trade weights. 
Roger and Vitek (2012) use a small multi-country macroeconometric model to 
assess the international spillover effects. They find there is a large scope for 
monetary policy to mitigate such effects. For each one percentage point 
increase in regulatory capital requirements, world GDP would experience a 
maximum additional fall of 0.01% compared to an hypothetical case where 
countries implement Basel III unilaterally. They conclude that the positive and 
negative effects of multilateral implementation cancel each other out at the 
world level. Country by country, however, the results vary as, for example, 
they find zero spillover effects for the UK but more significant negative 
spillover effects in Germany and China53. Their study does not consider the 
benefits of higher prudential requirements. 
For the UK, we find that the positive effects from lower inflation and interest 
rates overcome the negative effects from lower exports and wealth on GDP. 
We calculate that unilateral implementation would increase the costs of the 
policy response to around £8bn per annum. This compares with the estimated 
£4.9bn per annum cost of Basel III implemented multilaterally (see Table 6.1). 
We measure a negligible fall in benefits54 from multilateral implementation 
relative to implementation by the UK alone as we are only considering the 
benefits to the UK economy. However, improving financial stability in other 
countries would further reduce the probability of a crisis in the UK, as cross 
border banking networks would also be more stable. We have not included 
the additional benefits of multilateral implementation in our calculations.  
                                            
53
 NiGEM reproduces similar results with large negative spillover effects in China and 
Germany and with alleviating effects in the UK and the US. 
54
 This arises from the view that higher economic activity in the UK generates a slightly higher 
chance of asset price bubbles forming in the UK. 
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Figure A4.1 shows the difference in inflation and central bank targets due to 
international implementation. Unilateral implementation increased borrowing 
costs by around 20bp through central banks targeting higher base rates. 
Figure A4.1: Effects on UK inflation and interest rates 
 Inflation Target interest rates 
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Figure A4.2 compares the fall in GDP from the baseline under unilateral 
implementation and multilateral implementation; unilateral implementation 
increases the UK GDP shortfall by additional 0.2%. In the multilateral 
implementation case there is a higher GDP cost to the UK in the short run. 
This is directly linked to lower levels of international trade that cut UK exports 
and keeps the current account balance below the UK solo implementation 
levels by close to 0.3 percentage points of GDP. 
Figure A4.2: Impact on GDP of unilateral and multilateral implementation 
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